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Abstract 
Into the late 1990s the international community began to develop new 
methods for assisting fragile states. It was recognised that development principles 
and practice were often insufficient to resolve the ‘complex operations’ they were 
entering. This was especially true when engaging states that lacked either the 
political commitment or the practical capacity to deliver basic social and public 
services. The defining feature of these operations is that assistance is required 
across all pillars of civil society – economic, law and justice, governance and public 
administration. Without effectively addressing each of these pillars there is a 
significant risk of systemic failure.  
 
A key challenge of engagement across these pillars is coordinating the 
growing number of contributions – both civilian and military. The whole-of-
government approach has been promoted as a method to ameliorate this challenge. 
It is argued that the approach reduces departmental silos, promotes policy 
coherence, and provides efficiency while better addressing the complexity of the 
operating environment. While this may be true, the rhetoric is ill-defined and 
generates confusion as to what it means at a practical level. In short, it remains 
unclear how to achieve an efficient and effective whole-of-government approach or 
what that would actually look like. This thesis examines this dilemma and identifies 
the factors for successful implementation of New Zealand’s whole-of-government 
approach to peace support operations. 
 
Rather than concentrating on the formerly popular ‘machinery of government’ 
changes, this thesis argues that there are three overarching factors when 
implementing a whole-of-government approach. The first requirement is strategic 
direction from Government. This should come in the form of a national security 
statement and subsidiary individual country strategies. The second is culture change 
across the public sector. This focuses on the ‘soft issues’ such as organisational 
cultures, values and routines, professional beliefs, as well as institutional values and 
preferences. Significantly for peace support operations, this must be extended to 
promote a culture of education and awareness of host nation history and society. The 
third factor is accurate and flexible performance indicators and measurement to 
ensure that success can be identified and achieved. Effective execution of these 
factors will add value and promote excellence in New Zealand’s peace support 
operations. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Methodology 
 
What are the conditions and factors for, and the barriers to, successful 
implementation of New Zealand’s whole-of-government approach to peace support 
operations? 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
One of New Zealand’s leading contributions to international security and the 
rule of law is a continuing commitment to peace support operations (PSOs). PSOs 
led or endorsed by the United Nations have expanded in response to the increase in 
conflict, post-conflict and fragile states that require international assistance. A core 
role for New Zealand has been the contribution to the integrated state-building 
operations in Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste and Afghanistan. These “complex 
operations” require both civilian and military components from New Zealand to work 
alongside those of international and host nation partners.  
 
In 2005, the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) Fragile 
States Group (FSG) drafted a set of Principles for Good International Engagement in 
Fragile States. The Principles established that successful development in fragile 
environments largely depends on “well-sequenced and coherent progress across the 
political, security, economic and administrative domains.”1 These domains were held 
to be interdependent: “failure in one risks failure in all others”.2 They determined that 
working effectively across these domains “requires donor countries to adopt a ‘whole-
of-government’ approach (WGA), involving departments responsible for security, and 
political and economic affairs, as well as those responsible for development aid and 
humanitarian assistance.” The benefit of this approach, the FSG outlined, is that it 
promotes long-term development and stability in fragile states at a lower overall fiscal 
cost. Additionally, coherent policies and activities will likely generate greater 
legitimacy in the recipient country and are therefore more likely to receive a positive 
response. 
 
With New Zealand’s involvement in these complex operations, a growing 
number of ministries and agencies are taking on international responsibilities in 
addition to their domestic portfolios. An analysis of New Zealand official information 
                                               
1 OECD Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States (Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) Fragile States Group (FSG), 2006)  available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/24/37826256.pdf (accessed 22 March 2011.) 13. 
2 Ibid.   7. 
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over this period illustrates that the whole-of-government approach is being applied to 
manage these interrelated commitments.  However, policy making for whole-of-
government is a complex system with multiple sectors and levels of decision making. 
Policy researchers have shown that this has generated confusion as to what the 
rhetoric actually means at a practical level.  
 
This research will critically review the international literature on the whole of 
government approach as a service delivery strategy in peace support operations. 
The thesis will look at the background and terminology as well as whole of 
government approaches internationally. Attention will then turn to identifying the 
conditions and factors for, and the barriers to, successful implementation of New 
Zealand’s whole-of-government approach to peace support operations.  
 
 
1.2 Thesis Outline 
 
 
 To examine New Zealand’s whole-of-government approach to peace support 
operations I believe it is necessary to provide a detailed history and background of 
the whole-of-government concept. This will provide building blocks on which to look 
at the subsequent development of the concept in different jurisdictions and sectors. It 
will also extract from each stage a set of conditions, factors and barriers to the 
successful implementation of the concept.  
 
The natural starting point into an examination of the whole-of-government is 
to provide a literature review and analysis of the development of the concept 
internationally. Chapter Two provides this analysis by drawing on international 
literature, defining the terminology and outlining the basic features. It then draws out 
of the literature the barriers, conditions and factors that are salient in efficient and 
effective implementation. Chapter Three applies this framework to international use 
of the concept in peace support operations. After this the thesis moves towards a 
survey of the concept in New Zealand domestic governance. It examines how the 
concept is a central component of public sector reform in the period after the so-
called ‘new public management’ era. It also looks towards the formal and informal 
responses by government to attempt to drive this change across the public sector. 
 
It is at this point that the thesis is adequately prepared to analyse how the 
whole-of-government approach has been implemented in New Zealand’s peace 
support operations. Chapter Five provides a review of the origins of the interest in the 
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concept, and outlines where it fits into the structures of New Zealand’s external 
security policy. With this performed, the final chapter is able to draw on the complete 
research and provide a detailed picture of what the concept should look like when 
implemented appropriately. Of specific significance is the provision of a performance 
indicator framework to add value to New Zealand’s whole-of-government operations. 
 
 
1.3 Methodology  
 
 This research draws on methodology that is qualitative in nature. It provides a 
detailed literature review that analyses the broader policy environment then 
narrowing to concentrate on the specific subject of this thesis – New Zealand’s 
whole-of-government approach to peace support operations. It addresses the 
research questions by applying a comparative approach. Implementation of the 
whole-of-government approach in several countries will be contrasted with the 
implementation in New Zealand. Countries have been selected that have historically 
close political and cultural ties to New Zealand. It is these nations that New Zealand 
most often collaborates with in peace support operations. Within New Zealand, state 
agencies at the central level form the main object of the study. They will be studied in 
a broader context but also with respect to their own governance structure, their 
internal management, their organisational culture, and their performance. The data 
basis of the chapters is a comprehensive comparative survey approach. Data is 
drawn from the literature through a comprehensive comparative survey approach in 
different countries, as well as document studies and media coverage. 
 
 
1.3.1 Theoretical Foundation 
 
Policy analysis targets what governments intend to do, what they actually do, 
why they do it and what differences it makes.3 Studies of public policy are generally 
preoccupied with the underlying question in political science: “Who gets what, when 
and why?”4 The objective of the analysis of existing policy is to identify how future 
political problems may be more efficiently and effectively addressed. Policy analysis 
                                               
3 See: Rannveig Røste Innovation in the Public Sector: Studies of Innovation in the Public Sector, a 
Theoretical Framework (Publin Report No. D16, 2005)  available at 
http://www.step.no/publin/reports/d16litteraturesurvey.pdf (accessed 27 February 2011) 15, S. Z. and 
Cahn Theodoulou, M. A., Public Policy. The Essential Readings (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
1995). 
4 See: H D Laswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When and How (Cleveland: Meridan, 1936). 
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is often biased, and it is therefore advantageous to use several different theoretical 
perspectives in the study of existing policy and political processes.5 
 
The theoretical basis for the study of public sector organisations is drawn 
from different schools. It is useful to avoid single-factor explanations and instead aim 
to gain a healthier understanding of change in public sector organisations and its 
effects by combining different theoretical approaches.6 Additionally, with the wide 
variety of theoretical approaches, come rival vocabularies and terminologies.7 This is 
certainly seen in the attempt to define the whole-of-government approach in Chapter 
Two of this thesis. 
  
This thesis draws on a variety of theoretical models. Principal agent theory is 
one of these. As outlined by Per Lægreid and Koen Verhoest, this theory deals with 
the design and control problem a principal has when delegating a task to a 
specialised and autonomous agent. It refers to the agency problem a government 
faces when dealing with autonomous public bodies. The theory advocates the use of 
result based management tools and incentives, in order to counterbalance agencies’ 
autonomy and to increase their performance. Explored in more detail in Chapter 
Four, this theory argues that change will be best driven if results are linked to 
tangible rewards – such as pecuniary incentives. 
 
The research draws intuitively from a constructivist standpoint. As stressed by 
Brewer and Selden Colman, organisational performance is a socially constructed 
phenomenon that is subjective, complex, and particularly hard to measure in the 
public sector.8 This research follows this conviction and holds that the real essence 
of the nascent whole-of-government reforms has been an awareness of the social 
complexity of the operating environment. My thesis will argue that rather than 
continue the formerly popular ‘machinery of government’ changes – a central 
requirement to reach an effective and efficient whole-of-government approach is 
culture change. In effect, institutional norms need to be transformed to promote more 
joined up working. This needs to be supported by a dedicated culture of learning – 
especially about the nuances of the individual countries requiring assistance. While 
                                               
5 Røste Innovation in the Public Sector: Studies of Innovation in the Public Sector, a Theoretical 
Framework   15. 
6 Per Lægreid and Koen Verhoest, ed., Governance of Public Sector Organizations: Proliferation, 
Autonomy and Performance (Palgrave Macmillan 2010), 6. 
7 Røste Innovation in the Public Sector: Studies of Innovation in the Public Sector, a Theoretical 
Framework   15. 
8 Gene A Brewer and Sally Coleman Selden, 'Why Elephants Gallop: Assessing and Predicting 
Organizational Performance in Federal Agencies,' Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory 10, no. 4 (2000): 688. 
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there has been awareness that ‘militaries cannot go it alone’ and require civilian 
assistance, this must be complemented by enhanced education into the host nation – 
their culture, their history and their way of doing business. This is an iterative process 
that will benefit from recognition that working together in these environments requires 
a socialisation of ideas and actions.  
 
Lastly, I argue that context is related to cultural processes. As Philip Selznick 
identified in 1957, public organisations evolve gradually by adapting to internal and 
external pressure.9 In a process of institutionalisation they develop distinct cultural 
features represented by their informal norms and values.10 In specific relation to this 
research, in the security sector this process develops distinct and entrenched raisons 
d’être in which equally distinct and entrenched departmental esprit de corps are 
developed. When attempting to ‘join-up’ government departments this constructive 
process needs to be fully understood. This requires agencies and departments to 
better educate their peers in the New Zealand Government about their unique 
methods and values. This would enhance empathy across the public sector thus 
promoting better understanding of why other agencies act in certain ways and to 
leverage the most value out of any collaboration. 
 
 
1.4 Barriers to the Thesis 
 
 
One of the challenges in performing this research was the difficulty faced in 
locating comprehensive information about New Zealand’s commitments to peace 
support operations. The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) provides valuable 
information in its annual reports and on their website about current operations. Apart 
from NZDF however, there is little public information available about these 
commitments. The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) 
provides a broad outline of its involvement and leadership of ‘NZ Inc’ – though NZ Inc 
is not specifically focused towards peace support operations (and to date has had 
little impact on them). Several other government departments refer to their 
involvement in peace support operations in their annual reports, though apart from 
those meagre references, there is a real dearth of information about the size of New 
                                               
9 See: P Selznick, Leadership in Administration (New York: Harper & Row, 1957). 
10 Tom Christensen & Per Lægreid, "Democracy and Administrative Policy: Contrasting Elements of 
NPM and Post-NPM" (paper presented at the EGPA Annual Conference ‘The Public Service: Public 
Service Delivery in the Information Age’, Study Group VI: Governance of Public Sector Organizations, 
Malta, 2-5 September 2009) available at 
http://www.egpa2009.com/documents/psg6/Christensen%20&%20Laegreid.pdf (accessed 03 January 
2011) 9. 
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Zealand’s combined presence in these operations. A significant weakness is that 
there is no centralised source providing comprehensive information about New 
Zealand’s whole-of-government contributions.11 As a result, the public (especially 
media and academia) cannot easily obtain accurate information on the use of the 
whole-of-government approach to these operations.  
 
A further challenge with this type of research is securing formal, recorded 
interviews. I met with resistance from interviewees when conducting field research for 
the thesis in Timor-Leste when I asked whether they would sign the university ethics 
forms and go ‘on the record’. I found that they were very prepared to talk ‘off the 
record’ and did not mind me taking notes, but were reluctant to be formally recorded. 
My university approved ethics requirements enabled full anonymity, though in a small 
environment such as Dili, people believed it was possible for comments to be traced 
to a source. I adapted my research to this development. This was certainly not fatal 
to the Master’s thesis – in contrast, it enabled me to gather better material with which 
to shape the thesis. However, if I were to undertake doctoral research I would design 
the field work differently. One change would be to spend several lengthy periods in-
country to build relationships.12 
                                               
11 See recommendations from Australian Senate: Australian Government Australia's Involvement in 
Peacekeeping Operations (The Senate: Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 
2008). 
12 I note that a PhD student from Monash University who was staying for a short time in the same Dili 
guesthouse as I was had identical problems gaining formal permission to record his interviews. 
  
 
Chapter 2: The Whole-of-Government Approach 
 
This chapter aims to critically review the international literature on the whole 
of government approach.13 The section will outline the historical development of the 
concept and discuss the difficulties with the definitions of this idea. It will then 
summarise the basic features, conditions for and barriers to successful 
implementation. This examination will be used in the following chapters as a 
benchmark to analyse the approach in New Zealand’s peace support operations. 
This will form the basis of an argument that an efficient and effective whole-of-
government approach requires more than structural changes. Indeed, to extract the 
most value out of the concept, culture change at multiple levels of decision making 
and action is required. 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Background 
 
Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid’s research found that the concept of 
“whole-of-government” was initially termed “joined-up government” (JUG).14 
Supporting this evaluation, a 2008 literature survey compiled by Elizabeth Eppel 
showed that there was “no lingua franca for the variegated multi party arrangements 
that have become common in the last decade.”15 In explanation, Eppel pointed to 
differing conceptual and theoretical perspectives that permeate the literature.16 
Christopher Hood had found the same about the historical underpinnings, noting that, 
                                               
13 See for previous analysis into the related concept of collaboration: Debiprosad Majumdar, 
'Collaboration among Government Agencies with Special Reference to New Zealand: A Literature 
Review,' Social Policy Journal of New Zealand, no. 27 (2006). 
14 Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid, 'The Whole-of-Government Approach to Public Sector Reform,' 
Public Administration Review 67, no. 6 (2007). 
15 Elizabeth Eppel Better Connected Services for Kiwis: Achieving Outcomes by Joining Up: A Liturature 
Review (School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington, 2008)  available at 
http://ips.ac.nz/events/completed-
activities/joiningup/Integrated%20Government%20Services%20lit%20review%20outline%20%20v4%20
revised%20May2008.doc  3. 
16 Ibid. 
The research questions that guided this section are: 
 
• What is the background of the WGA? 
• What is meant by a WGA? 
• What are the motivations for a WGA? 
• What are the perceived benefits of a WGA? 
• What are the basic features of a WGA? 
• What are the conditions for the success of a WGA? 
• What are the barriers to successful implementation of a WGA? 
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“it is difficult to trace the history of ideas about coordination because the subject is a 
nebulous one, appearing in several different disciplinary literatures and spanning 
many institutional and policy domains.”17  
 
The concept of JUG has developed under various guises. Traditionally 
referred to as coordination, Oxford University Professor of Government Christopher 
Hood outlined that at its most general level “the doctrine holds that all or many parts 
of executive government should interconnect, complement one another, and pool 
related information.”18 Hood has elsewhere observed that while JUG is a new term it 
is in fact an old administrative doctrine. In fact, the doctrine of coordination can be 
traced back at least as far as Jeremy Bentham’s Constitutional Code, published in 
1820.19 Christensen and Lægreid argue a similar point, asking whether it was really a 
new development, as it advanced the “old question of coordination”.20 They stressed 
that, “elements of it have been observable in the United kingdom and Canada for 
sometime.”21 Despite this, they believed it was fair to say that the approach “has 
been revitalized and become more comprehensive.”22 
  
 While the historical development may be somewhat opaque, the impetus for 
the recent development of the whole-of-government approach is not. It is widely 
agreed that what is now termed the ‘whole of government approach’ was launched in 
direct response to the New Public Management (NPM) reforms of the 1980s and 
1990s.23 Those reforms applied Chicago School economic theory to public 
management. This was built on the presumption that public servants were motivated 
by the same factors as their private sector counterparts, namely economic incentives 
and disincentives.24 However, as James Q Wilson illustrated in his seminal 1989 
work Bureaucracy, public agencies necessarily operate under vastly different 
conditions from private enterprise.25 
 
                                               
17 Christopher Hood, "The Idea of Joined-up Government: A Historical Perspective," in Joined-up 
Government, (ed). Vernon Bogdanor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 20. 
18 Ibid., 19. 
19 Vernon Bogdanor, "Introduction," in Joined-up Government, (ed). Vernon Bogdanor (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 2. 
20 Lægreid, 'The Whole-of-Government Approach to Public Sector Reform,' 1059. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 See: Ibid, Bogdanor, "Introduction.", Getting Better at Managing for Shared Outcomes: A Resource for 
Agency Leaders  (Prepared by the Managing for Shared Outcomes Development Group for the 
Managing for Outcomes Programme Office, 2004)  available at 
http://www.ssc.govt.nz/upload/downloadable_files/mfso-resource.pdf, Jonathan Davies, 'The Limits of 
Joined up Government: Towards a Political Analysis,' Public Administration 87, no. 1 (2009). 
24 Bogdanor, "Introduction," 9. 
25 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: 
Basic Books, 1989), chapter 17. 
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Wilson argued that economists evaluate enterprise, whether public or private, 
by the efficiency criterion – that is by “obtaining the most output for a given level of 
resources.”26 In contrast, Wilson held that the outputs of governments are always 
complex and often controversial.27 Moreover, they have distributional effects that are 
required to fit an equitable social contract – taxes in return for equal and fair 
distribution of outputs. Citizens also expect government departments to be 
accountable in a way that businesses are not. Reinforcing this is a political system 
that provides “one vote to each person and one district to each legislator”.28 Wilson 
eloquently described, “The currency of the marketplace may be wealth, which is 
divided unequally, but the currency of politics is votes, which are distributed 
equally.”29 An overarching theme of Wilson’s text was that while there is little doubt 
that in pure economical terms private enterprise is more efficient than public 
bureaucracies, governments are required to take a more holistic approach to building 
and maintaining societies.  
 
Wilson’s argument proved to be somewhat prescient. By the mid to late 
1990s, cracks began to form between the ideology and the practice of the rational 
choice economic reforms. Bob Gregory claimed that:30 
 
The [NPM] reforms had focused on issues of accountability and efficiency at the 
operational level of government, but in creating an ‘arms length’ relationship between 
the political executive and government agencies, and their concern for structural 
disaggregation, they diminished strategic capability.     
 
Gregory concluded that the NPM reforms had caused “structural problems that were 
unintended – though by no means unpredictable”.31 One of these unintended effects 
was that it “deprived the political and administrative leadership of levers of control 
and influence and information.”32 This subsequently raised serious questions of 
accountability and control. 
 
 
                                               
26 Ibid., 347-8. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Robert Gregory, "Theoretical Faith and Practical Works: De-Autonomizing and Joining-up in the New 
Zealand State Sector," in Autonomy and Regulation: Coping with Agencies in the Modern State (ed). 
Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006), 138. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid The Whole-of-Government Approach - Regulation, Performance, 
and Public-Sector Reform (Working Paper 6, Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Studies, 2006)  available at 
https://bora.uib.no/bitstream/1956/1893/1/N06-06%20Christensen-L%C3%A6greid.pdf (accessed 9 
September 2010) 7. 
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2.2 Motivations for Whole-of-Government 
 
 According to Geoff Mulgan, the highly departmentalised Westminster systems 
of government developed since the late nineteenth century were often very efficient. 
They prevented corruption and waste, ensured clear lines of accountability and 
generally “helped to get things done”.33 With the NPM reforms of those systems in 
the 1980s and 1990s a number of weaknesses were exposed in the evolved model. 
The ‘tubes’ or ‘silos’ which filtered money from government to the public became a 
key inhibitor to efficient government action. Many issues did not fit neatly into 
departmental slots. By their very nature, vertical organisations disincentivise certain 
activities, such as prevention, as the benefits of preventative action often flow to 
other departments. It can also lead to government being less sensitive to certain 
groups who cut across departmental lines. Mulgan indicated that at worst it 
incentivised departments and agencies to dump problems onto each other.34 He 
critiqued that schools expelled unmanageable children onto the streets where they 
become an issue for police; prisons released parolees into the community without 
sufficient job training or housing where they become a burden for social services.35 
 
Mulgan listed six prominent factors that contributed to the development of the 
whole-of-government approach in the 1990s.36 Firstly, the “wicked issues” that could 
not be easily resolved with existing tools or structures. Secondly, there was mounting 
evidence that the NPM reforms prevented effective knowledge sharing and were not 
geared to the integrative potential of the internet. Thirdly, there was a growing 
literature by social scientists on the interconnectedness of problems. Fourthly, the 
rapid advancement in technology and organisational techniques, especially 
communication and coordination, meant that horizontal networks were becoming 
integral in achieving outcomes. Fifthly, the influence in consumerism had led to the 
public demanding services that better met their needs. The public also increasingly 
expects services to be easily accessible such as in ‘one stop shops’ – as Patrick 
Dunleavy questioned, why can’t the government “be more like Marks and Spencer or 
John Lewis?”.37 Finally, Mulgan highlighted that there was a broad shift in the late 
                                               
33 Geoff Mulgan, "Joined-up Government: Past, Present, and Future," in Joined-up Government, (ed). 
Vernon Bogdanor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 177. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 179. 
37 Professor Dunleavy raised the question: “…why aren’t public services easily accessible, all in one 
place, in a location everyone goes to on a regular basis? Why do citizens have to make several phone 
calls and visits to different government agencies over several days, weeks or even months to solve a 
problem?”. Patrick Dunleavy The Future of Joined-up Public Services (2020 Public Services Trust, 
2010)  available at http://clients.squareeye.com/uploads/2020/documents/esrc_dunleavy.pdf  6. 
Chapter 2: The Whole-of-Government Approach 
11 
 
twentieth century away from atomistic models of thinking towards a greater emphasis 
on systems thinking.38 
 
Christensen and Lægreid added an additional set of factors for the 
development of whole-of-government approaches. One of those factors was that for 
number of reasons the world is perceived as increasingly insecure and dangerous.39 
They highlight that concerns raised by terrorist attacks have had significant 
repercussions for public-sector reforms in the US, the UK, and Australia.40 A growing 
number of countries were becoming concerned about crises and natural disasters, 
like tsunamis or pandemics such as SARS or bird flu. This has resulted in a 
tightening-up of government, which includes whole-of-government measures. Of 
particular importance for this thesis, Christensen and Lægreid stress that the 
contemporary threat of terrorism has “underlined the importance of governments’ 
avoiding contradictory outcomes and ensuring that information is shared between 
agencies.”41 Their argument is directly applicable to New Zealand’s recent security 
and intelligence sector reforms where a concentration was placed on aligning the 
roles of the agencies involved in national security.42 
 
A further factor for Christensen and Lægreid is that the whole-of-government 
approach has been seen as an efficiency measure and an answer to budgetary 
pressure.43  They note that this may sound contradictory following the introduction of 
organised fragmentation in the name of efficiency under the NPM reforms. It is 
argued that a “vertical tightening of the system combined with increased horizontal 
collaboration” is now being seen as more efficient than a more fragmented system, 
with a focus mainly on efficiency in service delivery.44 This will be particularly salient 
when analysising the New Zealand National Government’s motivation and public 
reasoning for their dedication to the whole-of-government approach. 
 
In response to these developments, the UK was the first to begin to move 
away from exclusive adherence to the rational choice instrumentalism of NPM. Tony 
Blair’s New Labour government in 1997 was credited with the initial move, which was 
                                               
38 Mulgan, "Joined-up Government: Past, Present, and Future," 180. 
39 Lægreid The Whole-of-Government Approach - Regulation, Performance, and Public-Sector Reform   
7. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 NZSIS Annual Report for the Year Ended 30 June 2010 (New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, 
2009)  available at http://www.security.govt.nz/reports/ar10/nzsis-ar10.pdf (accessed 10 January 2011) 
5. 
43 Lægreid The Whole-of-Government Approach - Regulation, Performance, and Public-Sector Reform. 
44 Ibid. 
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closely followed by several other commonwealth nations.45 Christensen and Lægreid 
asserted that the Anglo-Saxon countries “once seen as the trail-blazers of NPM” are 
now leading the way in whole of government reforms.46 The new package, initially 
labelled ‘Joined-Up Government’, proposed a change in emphasis away from the 
“structural devolution, dissagregation, and single-purpose organizations” of NPM.47 
Vernon Bogdanor described a move towards a “more holistic approach” that sought 
to “apply not only the logic of economics, but also the insights of the other social 
sciences … to the reform of the public services.”48  
 
 
2.3 Terminology 
 
In the public policy literature, the broad notion of integrated service delivery 
encompasses a number of inter-related concepts. These include, but are not limited 
to, coordination, collaboration, whole of government, joined-up government, 
horizontal government, policy coherence, networked government, inter-sectoral 
collaboration, inter-agency co-operation as well as partnership.49 The literature varies 
as to accepted definitions and the differences between these concepts. As argued 
above, this is in large part because the rhetoric and language of policy has evolved 
differently subject to the field, research or theories on which it is based.50  
  
One imprecise development has been a movement from the use of the term 
‘joined-up government’ towards using ‘whole of government’. The relationship 
between these two terms has been debated. Alison Gray’s literature survey on 
integrated service delivery in 2002 argued with compelling evidence that there were 
distinct differences between JUG and WGA. Gray stated that, “While references to 
‘whole of government’ activity often refer to policy development, references to ‘joint 
working’ and ‘joined-up’ government typically emphasise structures and contractual 
or organisational arrangements for service delivery, rather than shared involvement 
                                               
45 Lægreid, 'The Whole-of-Government Approach to Public Sector Reform,' 1060. 
46 Lægreid The Whole-of-Government Approach - Regulation, Performance, and Public-Sector Reform   
6. 
47 Lægreid, 'The Whole-of-Government Approach to Public Sector Reform,' 1. 
48 Bogdanor, "Introduction." 
49 For useful surveys of these terms see: Alison Gray Integrated Service Delivery and Regional Co-
Ordination: A Literature Review (Review of the Centre – Regional Co-ordination Workstream, 2002)  
available at http://www.msd.govt.nz/documents/about-msd-and-our-work/publications-
resources/archive/2003-integrated-service-delivery-regional-coordination-literature-review.pdf  1, and, 
Perri 6, 'Joined-up Government in the Western World in Comparative Perspective: A Preliminary 
Literature Review and Exploration,' Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 14, no. 1 
(2004). 
50 See: Jim Hyde, 'How to Make the Rhetoric of Joined-up Government Really Work,' Australia New 
Zealand Health Policy 5 (2008): 5. 
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in policy-making.”51 With the development and implementation of the whole-of-
government approach in various countries it is now less certain that Gray’s argument 
is as persuasive as it was in 2002. 
 
According to Christensen and Lægreid, the overlap between JUG and WGA 
is semantic. While they accept that the scope of the whole-of-government approach 
is “pretty broad”, they point to the Australian Management Advisory Committee’s 
Connecting Government Report (2004) which provided this definition of the WGA in 
the Australian Public Service:52 
 
Whole-of-government denotes public services agencies working across portfolio 
boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government response to 
particular issues. Approaches can be formal or informal. They can focus on policy 
development, program management, and service delivery. 
 
This definition demonstrates that in the Australian context, the whole-of-government 
approach is wider than Gray’s narrow interpretation that focused on policy 
formulation. In another attempt at deciphering the rhetoric in 2005, Sue Hunt 
observed that:53 
 
The term ‘joined-up’ government tends to be used in the United Kingdom, while 
‘horizontal’ management’ or horizontal government’ is used in Canada. In Australia, 
integrated or collaborative government are corresponding terms … while ‘whole-of-
government’ tends to refer to the set of processes that are intended to result in 
more integrated policy and service delivery outcomes for government. 
 
Hunt’s account confirms that there is no consistent definition of the concepts. This 
conclusion was reached by the Connecting Government Report, which outlined:54 
 
There are various models, frameworks and concepts outlined in the literature which 
attempt to classify whole of government approaches. However, there is no 
overriding theory that captures all key aspects. This is an evolving field of 
investigation, both at the practice and theoretical level. 
 
 
                                               
51 Gray Integrated Service Delivery and Regional Co-Ordination: A Literature Review   5. 
52 Lægreid, 'The Whole-of-Government Approach to Public Sector Reform,' 1060, Connecting 
Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia’s Priority Challenges  (Management 
Advisory Committee, Commonwealth of Australia, 2004)  available at 
http://www.apsc.gov.au/mac/connectinggovernment.htm (accessed 04 January 2011) 4. 
53 Sue Hunt Whole-of-Government: Does Working Together Work? (Policy and Governance Discussion 
Paper 05-01, Australian National University, Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government, 2005)  
7. 
54 Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia’s Priority Challenges    225. 
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Christensen and Lægreid argued that rather than become tied down by 
conceptual terminology it is more beneficial to accept that the WGA “does not 
represent a coherent set of ideas and tools.”55 They believed that it could be “best be 
seen as an umbrella term describing a group of responses to the problem of 
increased fragmentation of the public sector and public services and a wish to 
increase integration, coordination, and capacity.”56  
 
2.4 Basic Features 
 
Conceptually, the whole-of-government approach represents a desire to 
achieve horizontal and vertical coordination to reduce situations where related 
policies undermine each other.57 This, it is thought, will enhance the value of 
resources and create synergies by drawing together various stakeholders in a 
particular policy area.58 It also seeks to offer clients seamless rather than fragmented 
access to and delivery of services.  
 
Alice Mosley has reduced the framing of whole-of-government into two 
distinct strands of public administration theory one of which can be termed a ‘rational 
administrative’ and the other a ‘bureaucratic politics’ perspective.59 The former is 
regarded as the dominant framework within which “policy prescriptions surrounding 
joined-up government are articulated, and has dominated the coordination and inter 
organisational relations literature.”60 The latter emphasises the “competing interests 
and power dynamics at play in the context of joined-up government.”61 Moseley 
argues that the key aspects dominating collaborative decision-making include:62 
 
…prioritisation of, and a desire to protect resources for, agencies’ and departments’ 
own client groups; the greater ability of the most powerful actors to gain the 
cooperation of other bodies in order to advance their own organisational agendas; and 
the adoption of coordination mechanisms to reduce risk and maintain organisational 
survival. 
 
                                               
55 Lægreid, 'The Whole-of-Government Approach to Public Sector Reform,' 1059. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Lægreid The Whole-of-Government Approach - Regulation, Performance, and Public-Sector Reform   
6. 
58 Lægreid, 'The Whole-of-Government Approach to Public Sector Reform.', Christopher Pollitt, 'Joined-
up Government: A Survey,' Political Studies Review 1, no. 1 (2003). 
59 Alice Moseley, "Joined-up Government: Rational Administration or Bureaucratic Politics?" (paper 
presented at the Public Administration Committee Annual Conference, University of Glamorgan, 7th-9th 
September 2009) available at http://hass.glam.ac.uk/media/files/documents/2009-08-
05/AMoseley_PAC_09.pdf (accessed 24 January 2011) 2.  
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid.  1. 
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Christensen and Lægreid indicate that they also do not believe in single-factor 
explanations and provide structural and cultural perspectives.63 They note that from a 
structural or instrumental perspective the whole-of-government approach can be 
seen as conscious organisational design or reorganisation. The assumption is that 
political and administrative leaders use the structural design of public entities as 
instruments to fulfil public goals. In the case of whole-of-government this requires 
government organisations to work better together.64 The significant precondition for 
this is that leaders have a relatively large degree of control over change or reform 
processes and that they rely highly on rational calculation. 
 
On the other hand, a cultural-institutional explanation sees the development 
of public organisations more as evolution than ‘revolution’ and redesign. With much 
in common with the international relations notion of constructivism, cultural-
institutional explanations are useful when analysing the whole-of-government 
approach. Christensen and Lægreid write that, “while structure receives significant 
attention, even more emphasis is given to the importance of cultural change for 
successful WOG systems.”65 A key theme is that structure is not enough to fulfil the 
goals of whole-of-government initiatives - cultural change is necessary. Processes 
and attitudes need to be addressed in order to drive collaboration across 
departments.  An overall characteristic is that the post-NPM reforms are less 
preoccupied with structural changes and more concerned with evolutionary change 
resulting from conscious policy choices.66 The focus is more on building a “unified 
sense of values, teambuilding, the collective involvement of participating 
organisations, trust, value-based management, collaboration, and improving the 
training and self-development of public servants.”67 The Australian Management 
Advisory Committee Connecting Government Report stressed the need to build a 
supportive Australian public sector culture that encouraged whole-of-government 
                                               
63 Lægreid The Whole-of-Government Approach - Regulation, Performance, and Public-Sector Reform   
9. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Chris Eichbaum Jonathan Boston, "State Sector Reform and Renewal in New Zealand: Lessons for 
Governance" (paper presented at the Conference on Repositioning of Public Governance – Global 
Experiences and Challenges, Taipei, 18-19 November 2005) available at 
http://www.victoria.ac.nz/commonwealthseminar/Papers/NZPapers/Boston%20and%20Eichbaum%20-
%20State%20Sector%20Renewal%20in%20New%20Zealand.pdf (accessed 31 December 2010) 19-
20, Lægreid The Whole-of-Government Approach - Regulation, Performance, and Public-Sector 
Reform. 
67 Lægreid The Whole-of-Government Approach - Regulation, Performance, and Public-Sector Reform   
13. 
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solutions by formulating value guidelines and codes of conduct, where the slogan is 
‘working together’.68 
 
One distinguishing feature of a whole of government approach is that there is 
a focus on sharing objectives across organisational boundaries in contrast to working 
solely within an organisation.69 Geoff Mulgan highlighted two primary concerns that 
the whole-of-government approach seeks to resolve:70 
 
1. A problem of coordination: how to cajole and encourage an often huge flotilla of agencies, 
departments, units and professions to point in broadly the same broad direction, and not to 
undermine each other’s work. 
2. A problem of organization and integration: how to align incentives, cultures, and structures 
of authority to fit critical tasks that cut across organizational boundaries. 
 
In light of these issues, a range of measures has been implemented across the 
countries that are taking on whole of government approaches. A theme of these 
measures is that there is ‘no one size fits all’ whole of government approach.71 The 
2004 Australian Report argued that, “There needs to be a range of organisational 
options available to deliver policies, programs and services across organisational 
boundaries successfully. The structure should be matched to the task.”72  
 
Debiprosad Majumdar’s literature survey on collaboration across government 
agencies found several writers expressing similar views about the basic features of 
collaboration.73 Gray characterised it by interdependence and participative decision-
making and Sussman believed that mutually agreed outcomes and a willingness to 
share resources as critical to successful collaboration.74 Majumdar showed that 
O’Looney and Wilson established the ultimate objective of collaboration: O’Looney 
claimed that, “collaboration refers to partnership formation that is believed to bring 
about change”, while Wilson found collaboration to be the most effective tool to 
“create something entirely new”.75  
 
                                               
68 See: Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia’s Priority Challenges. 
69 Ibid.    4. 
70 Mulgan, "Joined-up Government: Past, Present, and Future," 176. 
71 Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia’s Priority Challenges    12. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Majumdar, 'Collaboration among Government Agencies with Special Reference to New Zealand: A 
Literature Review.' Majumdar defined that “collaboration” denotes government agencies (also referred to 
as “participating organisations” or “parties”, “partners” or “stakeholders”) working across sectoral 
boundaries to achieve common goals.”  
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
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An early indication of the variety of activities that might be involved were 
summarised in the UK Cabinet’s 2000 Wiring it up: Whitehall's Management of 
Cross-cutting Policies and Services Report.76 The Report placed the activities into 
the following broad categories:77 
 
• Organisational change; 
• Merged structures and budgets; 
• Joint teams (virtual or real); 
• Shared budgets; 
• Joint customer inter-face arrangements; 
• Shared objectives and policy indicators; 
• Consultation to enhance synergies and manage trade-offs; 
• Sharing information to increase mutual awareness. 
 
Mulgan demonstrated that measures in the UK did not take shape in a single 
‘blueprint’, but that there was a deliberate decision to experiment with many forms.78 
These included:79 
 
• Taking a cross-cutting approach to policy making.  
 
• Managing joined up working through seminars, reports … networks such as the 
New Local Government Network and the role and implementation of the Prime 
Minister’s Strategy Unit in the Cabinet Office. 
 
• Activities to join up implementation of policies, through tools such as training and 
support in project management and implementation… 
 
Australian examples of whole of government approaches include the 
integrated response to the Bali bombings and Council of Australian Governments 
activities, such as the Australian Better Health Initiative or the whole of government 
indigenous trials.80 Centrelink, Australia Post and Rural Transaction Centres are also 
examples of integrated service delivery arrangements.81 In Canada, under the label 
                                               
76 Wiring It Up: Whitehall's Management of Cross-Cutting Policies and Services  (UK Cabinet Office, A 
Performance and Innovation Unit Report, 2000) (accessed 22 March 2011). 
77 Tom Ling, 'Delivering Joined-up Government in the UK: Dimensions, Issues and Problems,' Public 
Administration 80 (2002): 625. 
78 Mulgan, "Joined-up Government: Past, Present, and Future," 183. 
79 Ibid, Joined up Government: A Review of National and International Experiences  (State Government 
of Victoria State Services Authority, 2007)  available at 
http://www.ssa.vic.gov.au/CA2571410025903D/WebObj/OccPaper_JoinedupGovernment/$File/OccPap
er_JoinedupGovernment.pdf  8. 
80 Joined up Government: A Review of National and International Experiences    9. 
81 Ibid. 
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of horizontal management, the government launched a set of initiatives in the mid-
1990s in areas such as poverty, innovation and climate change.82  
 
 
2.5 Benefits 
 
 A number of potential benefits can be drawn out of the literature on whole-of-
government approaches. The New Zealand State Services Commission’s Factors for 
Successful Coordination - A Framework to Help State Agencies Coordinate 
Effectively listed a number of these benefits. The report illustrates several key 
themes on why public agencies should coordinate:83 
 
• Because the challenges facing New Zealand are bigger than one agency can solve alone 
• Because by pooling the best of our resources we provide better solutions 
• Because coordination can reduce duplication and provide New Zealanders with the best 
services at the right cost 
• New Zealanders are increasingly expecting government policies and services to be 
tailored for particular communities or client groups. 
 
This research reduces the benefits into four main areas: the reduction of 
departmental silos, an increase in policy coherence, maximising efficiency, and to 
more adequately address complex social problems. As will be seen later in the 
thesis, the same benefits have been applied to argue for the approach in peace 
support operations.  
 
 
2.5.1 Reduction of Departmental Silos 
 
Joined-up government is often understood to be an administrative solution to 
the problem of departmentalism. It can provide incentives for departments to look 
beyond their own narrow departmental interests.84 The Review of the Centre in New 
Zealand highlighted the ‘fragmentation’ and ‘siloisation’ of the public sector, resulting 
largely from the separation of policy and operational agencies and from the 
                                               
82 Lægreid The Whole-of-Government Approach - Regulation, Performance, and Public-Sector Reform   
11, see, Herman Bakvis and Luc Juillet The Horizontal Challenge: Line Departments, Central Agencies 
and Leadership (Canada School of Public Service, 2004)  available at http://www.csps-
efpc.gc.ca/pbp/pub/pdfs/P124_e.pdf (accessed 04 January 2011). 
83 Summarised from the original: SSC Factors for Successful Coordination - a Framework to Help State 
Agencies Coordinate Effectively (State Services Commission: New Zealand Government, 2008)  
available at http://www.ssc.govt.nz/state-services-coordination  8. 
84 Moseley, "Joined-up Government: Rational Administration or Bureaucratic Politics?"   2. 
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proliferation of core government agencies.85 Whole-of-government initiatives attempt 
to break through these vertical silos and encourage officials to work ‘horizontally’. 
This has been aided by a rapid growth in technology that enables faster and more 
secure communication between agencies. The natural result of a break down in silos 
is an increased awareness of collective social outcomes and the workings of partner 
agencies.    
 
 
2.5.2 Policy Coherence 
 
The reduction of silos within a whole-of-government approach will arguably 
lead to a greater level of policy coherence. The drive to eliminate contradictions and 
tensions between different policies will predominately have a positive impact on the 
effectiveness of those policies. Christopher Pollitt describes an example in the 1990s 
where a well-intentioned intensification of performance management in schools “led 
to a dramatic rise in the exclusion of difficult pupils from school and a rise in 
criminality among young people”.86 In essence, it reduces the negative externalities 
or spillover effects that may occur when one department or agency fails to take 
account of the impact of its actions on other parts of government.87  
 
 
2.5.3 Efficiency 
 
It is argued that a whole-of-government approach creates efficiencies by 
reducing duplication across the departments and agencies of government. The 
Factors for Successful Coordination report held that coordination is widely seen as a 
solution to the fragmentation of the State sector. The argument was made that 
fragmentation made coordinated service delivery more complicated, added to the 
costs of doing business by duplicating services, effort and expenses, and blured 
accountability for some issues.88 The Report highlighted that:89 
 
                                               
85 See: Report of the Advisory Group on the Review of the Centre  (Presented to the Ministers of State 
Services and Finance, November 2001)  available at 
http://www.ssc.govt.nz/display/document.asp?DocID=2776 (accessed 31 October 2010). 
86 Pollitt, 'Joined-up Government: A Survey,' 35. 
87 Ibid. 
88 SSC Factors for Successful Coordination - a Framework to Help State Agencies Coordinate 
Effectively   8. 
89 Ibid. 
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When the right agencies coordinate over a complex issue, they can develop targeted 
solutions based on a better understanding of the full scope of the issue, resulting in 
more effective interventions. 
 
The whole-of-government approach will also improve the information flow of ideas 
and cooperation between stakeholders in a particular policy sector, thus producing 
synergies or smarter ways of working.90  
 
2.5.4 Addressing Complex Problems 
 
It is argued that further value is gained from a whole-of-government approach 
due to the potential to more adequately address complex social problems. Alice 
Moseley asserted that another common argument is that working in a joined-up way 
should deliver more holistic responses to policy problems, particularly problems that 
transcend departmental boundaries.91 Lynne Dovey contends that a systems 
approach is required to achieve better social policy outcomes.92 When the full 
spectrum of agencies coordinate over a complex issue, they can develop targeted 
solutions based on a better understanding of the full scope of the issue, resulting in 
more effective interventions.93 The New Zealand literature argued that this will 
achieve “more and better outputs and outcomes for individuals and their families, 
empowering communities to be more self-reliant, and creating a more inclusive and 
co-ordinated public sector.”94 The following table, extracted from the Factors for 
Successful Coordination report, provides a summary of the advantages and 
disadvantages of a whole-of-government approach.  
 
                                               
90 Pollitt, 'Joined-up Government: A Survey,' 35. 
91 Moseley, "Joined-up Government: Rational Administration or Bureaucratic Politics?"   2. 
92 Lyne Dovey Achieving Better Social Outcomes in New Zealand through Collaboration: Perspectives 
from the United States (Working Paper No.16, State Services Commission, 2003)  available at 
http://www.ssc.govt.nz/upload/downloadable_files/Working_Paper_16.pdf (accessed 24 January 2011) 
3. 
93 SSC Factors for Successful Coordination - a Framework to Help State Agencies Coordinate 
Effectively. 
94 Majumdar, 'Collaboration among Government Agencies with Special Reference to New Zealand: A 
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Table 1: Advantages and Disadvantages of a Whole-of-Government Approach95 
 
 
2.6 Barriers 
 
 The literature indicates that there are a number of barriers to successful 
implementation of whole-of-government working. Christopher Pollitt contended that 
such efforts were no panacea; he described, “Efforts at [joined-up government] tend 
to be more fragile than ‘normal’, single silo policymaking.”96 The UK Cabinet Office’s 
initial review of cross-cutting issues in 2000 conceded that, “By their nature, cross-
cutting policies tend to have more stake-holders; be harder to monitor and evaluate; 
and run greater risks of failure and communications breakdown.”97  
 
An outcome of the 2001 New Zealand Review of the Centre was the 
formation of a research project termed the Integrated Service Delivery: Regional Co-
ordination workstream. This undertook a “review of the New Zealand and 
international literature on collaboration, carried out fieldwork in three regions in New 
Zealand, and drew on a range of relevant government reports.”98 The workstream 
established several further barriers to successful implementation of a whole-of-
government approach, including:99 
 
                                               
95 SSC Factors for Successful Coordination - a Framework to Help State Agencies Coordinate 
Effectively   10. 
96 Pollitt, 'Joined-up Government: A Survey,' 38. 
97 Wiring It Up: Whitehall's Management of Cross-Cutting Policies and Services    10. 
98 Review of the Centre Integrated Service Delivery: Regional Co-Ordination - Final Workstream Report  
(State Services Commission, Ministry of Social Development, 2003)  available at 
http://www.ssc.govt.nz/upload/downloadable_files/integrated-service-delivery-final-workstream-
report.pdf (accessed 29 January 2011) 4. 
99 Ibid.    13. 
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• no one agency at the centre with an overview  
• no government agency at the regional level with a clear mandate to lead regional initiatives  
• an increase in competition for resources between agencies  
• the nature of the funder/provider contracting regime  
• overall funding pressures limiting the level of resource that is allocated to co-ordination 
and collaboration  
• a tendency for some agencies to shift responsibilities to other agencies, withdraw from 
collaboration  
• differences between agencies priorities and national policy drivers which make it 
complicated to identify common interests  
• use of the Privacy legislation to limit the exchange of information across agencies.  
 
Christopher Pollitt’s research found three primary obstacles to joined-up working. The 
first is the tension between whole-of-government and the past and continuing 
success of performance management.100 Pollitt argues that individuals and 
organisations have become increasingly focused on achieving their own (individual, 
unit and departmental) performance targets. Due to this, unless cross-cutting targets 
can be given equal status, whole-of-government is unlikely to succeed.  
 
The second obstacle is accountability. Pollitt asserted that public sector 
modernisation has unsettled traditional models of ministerial and political 
accountability.101 He contended that the accountability literature holds several 
lessons for whole-of-government. The first is the importance of making a formal 
agreement. This is required at the establishment of any co-ordinated effort or 
partnership. It would outline the respective responsibilities of the different parties and 
institutions involved. Pollitt stressed that it would also be wise to agree what the 
procedure should be for revising that agreement, in the event that becomes 
necessary in light of later experiences.102  
 
A second requirement would be for a formal agreement, though by itself this 
is seldom sufficient. Those in partnership should look to maintain a culture that 
supports and promotes a sense of individual responsibility on the part of staff.103 
Vertical accountability necessarily remains, although horizontal accountability grows 
in importance. A third requirement is the need to amend procedures for external 
oversight. Audit bodies, inspectorates and even legislatures themselves will need to 
adapt to the reality of whole-of-government operations.104 
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The final issue for Pollitt is the risk of unintentionally creating a new set of 
organisational enclaves. Pollitt argues that it would not be difficult to slide into the 
worst of both worlds. He stressed that this is made from a combination of traditional, 
‘vertical’ organisations, with the principal legal responsibilities and means of delivery, 
and an overlay of fashionable new units or teams, which poach the most talented 
staff but lack either clear lines of accountability or the implementation capacity to get 
things done.105 
 
 A further aspect that has taken on added importance in the midst of a global 
financial crisis is that of the expense of joined-up working. The financial investment in 
working horizontally is substantial. The costs include increased meeting time, the 
challenge of creating a shared vision and framework, the need to compromise, more 
complex accountability arrangements, increased volumes in paper work, the 
development of shared performance indicators, and more complex reporting 
requirements. These impact noticeably on the strained budgets of line managers and 
their seniors – in order for these officials to support whole-of-government approaches 
there is a real requirement for them to be supported and to see tangible benefits. In 
acute awareness of this, the Integrated Service Delivery: Regional Co-ordination 
workstream suggested that the key issues that would require a policy response from 
Ministers and central government included the need to:106 
 
• remove structural barriers to collaboration eg by addressing service boundaries and funding 
mechanisms  
• emphasise ways to ensure that government systems and processes support and incentivise 
collaboration eg by addressing departmental accountabilities, managerial delegation at local 
level and evaluation arrangements  
• undertake further policy work to support collaborative working with stakeholder groups eg by 
addressing … whole of government approaches to working with local authorities  
• develop better monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to determine where collaboration is 
effective.  
 
The main themes of the barriers to whole-of-government working in the 
literature can therefore be reduced into three areas – structural, procedural and 
cultural. These factors need to be addressed if an efficient and successful whole-of-
government approach is to be implemented. These will be specifically important 
when assessing whole-of-government approaches to peace support operations.  
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2.7 Conditions and Factors 
 
 Flowing from the main barriers are the conditions and factors that must be 
present in order to implement a successful whole-of-government approach. In 2005, 
the Australian Public Service Commissioner Lynelle Briggs made a critical 
observation that whole-of-government outcomes were overwhelmingly reliant on 
driving culture change in government departments. Elaborating on this, Briggs 
argued that:107 
 
In the past, the outcomes we are now looking to achieve from whole of government 
activity were mostly pursued through organisational restructuring and machinery of 
government changes. What is new is that today’s whole of government approaches 
tend to look primarily to the development of organisational cultures, capabilities and 
relationships that support, model, understand and aspire to whole of government 
solutions. 
 
A central message is that “structure alone cannot drive cultural change, as processes 
and attitudes also need addressing”.108 As was suggested by the UK Cabinet Office 
in 2000, “Simply removing barriers to cross-cutting working is not enough: more 
needs to be done if cross-cutting policy initiatives are to hold their own against purely 
departmental objectives”.109 
 
The 2008 Factors for Successful Coordination Framework (New Zealand) 
highlighted nine success factors consistently identified in the literature. The report 
grouped those under three dimensions: mandate, systems and behaviours.110 The 
mandate dimension consisted of a leadership commitment, Ministers’ and 
stakeholders’ buy-in, and defined and agreed joint outcomes.111 The systems 
dimension requires appropriate and documented governance and accountability 
frameworks, sufficient and appropriate resources, and process to measure 
performance from established baselines. The Behaviours Dimension requires the 
right representation, skills and team leadership, organisational cultures that support 
                                               
107 Lynelle Briggs, "A Passion for Policy," in A Passion for Policy: Essays in Public Sector Reform, (ed). 
John Wanna (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2007), 9. 
108 Majumdar, 'Collaboration among Government Agencies with Special Reference to New Zealand: A 
Literature Review.' 
109 Wiring It Up: Whitehall's Management of Cross-Cutting Policies and Services    5. 
110 SSC Factors for Successful Coordination - a Framework to Help State Agencies Coordinate 
Effectively   11. 
111 Ibid. 
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coordination, and a shared culture, language and values.112 These are aimed at 
addressing the primary barriers to whole-of-government working and as will be seen, 
are specifically relevant to peace support operations. 
 
 The literature demonstrates that there is almost universal awareness of the 
factors required for joined-up working. There is a multitude of methods suggested to 
address these factors – though much is theoretical and there has been little empirical 
research undertaken.113 This is not unexpected as successful whole-of-government 
working is necessarily an extended process and does not naturally lend itself to 
short-term outcomes.  
 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 
 The whole-of-government approach has gained widespread appeal in the 
past decade. Initially it was a reaction to the rational economic reforms of the 1980s 
and 1990s, though it has also played a central role in the evolution of public 
management. Whole-of-government is not a panacea however; it comes with 
entrenched barriers that will take more than eloquent rhetoric to overcome. As 
Christopher Pollitt conveyed, it would be wise for proponents to regard it as “a long 
term project, a selective project, and a cooperative project – not something that 
central government can just decide to ‘have’.”114 A central feature that can be drawn 
from the literature is that successful whole-of-government approach requires a 
concentrated effort at driving culture change across levels and sectors of 
government. The following chapter will demonstrate that this is equally as significant 
in adapting the concept to peace support operations. As will be seen, there are 
significant hurdles in these environments where disciplined forces are increasingly 
working collaboratively with civilian agencies to reach collective outcomes.  
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Chapter 3: Whole of Government Approaches to 
Peace Support Operations 
 
This chapter draws on the concepts established in the first chapter and aims 
to critically review the international literature on the whole of government approach in 
peace support operations. The first section will look at the background and 
terminology as well as whole of government approaches internationally. Attention will 
then turn to drawing out the benefits and challenges of the whole of government 
approach in peace support operations. This literature in this chapter will be later used 
to evaluate how New Zealand is operating its whole-of-government approach in such 
operations. 
 
 
 
3.1 Background 
 
 In 2005, the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) Fragile 
States Group (FSG) drafted a set of Principles for Good International Engagement in 
Fragile States.115 The Principles established that successful development in fragile 
environments largely depends on “well-sequenced and coherent progress across the 
political, security, economic and administrative domains.”116 These domains were 
held to be interdependent: “failure in one risks failure in all others”.117 They 
determined that working effectively across these domains “requires donor countries 
to adopt a ‘whole-of-government’ approach (WGA), involving departments 
responsible for security, and political and economic affairs, as well as those 
responsible for development aid and humanitarian assistance.”118 The benefit of this 
approach, the FSG outlined, is that it promotes long-term development and stability 
in fragile states at a lower overall fiscal cost.119 Additionally, coherent policies and 
activities will likely generate greater legitimacy in the recipient country and are 
therefore more likely to receive a positive response.120 
                                               
115 OECD Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States   7. 
116 Ibid.   13. 
117 Ibid.   7. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid. 
The research questions that guided this section are: 
 
• What is the background to whole of government approaches in peace support operations? 
• What are the basic features of a WGA in PSOs? 
• What are the perceived benefits and challenges of a WGA in PSOs? 
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 After the perceived failures of the 1990s interventions such as in Somalia, 
Kosovo and Rwanda, the international community resolved to develop new methods 
for assisting fragile states.121 Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown held that the 
motivation for this was twofold. First, the international development community, 
including the bilateral donors of the OECD, the World Bank, and UN agencies, 
recognised that existing development principles and practice were often insufficient 
to resolve the ‘complex missions’ they were entering. This was especially true when 
engaging states that lacked either the political commitment or the practical capacity 
to deliver basic social services. States such as Afghanistan, Haiti, Somalia and 
Yemen suffered from low or negative levels of development and poor governance, 
and were often caught up in intractable conflicts. Due to these issues, donors 
struggled to find effective ways to engage such “difficult partners.”122  
 
  Patrick and Brown noted that a further factor was that security officials in 
donor states began to recognise the threats posed by weak and failing states.123 The 
‘spillover’ effects, such as transnational crime, terrorism, weapons proliferation, 
global pandemics, and environmental degradation strongly contributed to the 
realpolitik motives of donor states. UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw highlighted this 
in 2003 stating that these, “constitute a global agenda affecting all countries; they are 
linked to each other; and we need to address them before they lead to crises.”124  
 
One of the key international responses to these issues was the September 
2005 ratification at the UN World Summit of the Secretary General’s In Larger 
Freedom.125 In this document, the Secretary-General claimed that there is a “gaping 
hole” in the UN institutional machinery: “No part of the United Nations system 
                                               
121 For a discussion of the concept of “fragile states” see: Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown Greater 
Than the Sum of Its Parts?: Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile States 
(International Peace Academy, 2007)  available at 
http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/13893/  4, and, OECD Whole of Government 
Approaches to Fragile States   21. 
122 World Bank Engaging with Fragile States: An Ieg Review of World Bank Support to Low-Income 
Countries under Stress (Independent Evaluation Group, 2006)  available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/licus/docs/licus_ce.pdf, Brown Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts?: 
Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile States, Lisa Chauvet and Paul Collier 
Development Effectiveness in Fragile States: Spillovers and Turnarounds (Centre for the Study of 
African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University, 2004)  available at 
http://www.jica.go.jp/cdstudy/library/pdf/20071101_09.pdf. 
123 Brown Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts?: Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile 
States   2. 
124 Jack Straw UK International Priorities: A Strategy for the Fco (UK Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, December 2003)  available at 
http://www.sovereignty.org.uk/siteinfo/newsround/FCOStrategyFullFinal.pdf  1. 
125 In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All (Report of the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations for Decision by Heads of State and Government, September 
2005)  available at http://www.un-ngls.org/orf/UNreform/UBUNTU-1.pdf. 
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effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war 
to lasting peace.”126 The document was designed to strengthen both the sovereign 
capacities and the multilateral architecture of all states to address contemporary 
global threats. It entrenched the notions of freedom from fear and freedom from want, 
which are manifestations of the modern concepts of human security and the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Speaking on this issue, the New Zealand Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Phil Goff stated that:127 
 
In a post 9/11 environment we have been mesmerised, not unreasonably, by global 
security issues. Terrorism is an important issue but addressing its causes is as 
important as suppressing its symptoms. One cause is the alienation of those 
deprived of decent living standards and of hope. Meeting the poverty gap and 
development challenges are complimentary to meeting the challenges of political 
security. 
 
This statement was in line with the realisation in the international community that in 
order to resolve these issues, sustainable models of development and security 
assistance needed to be designed. It was acknowledged that these issues cut across 
government departments and so it was of critical importance that governments were 
able to implement integrated, cross-departmental responses. The crux of the 
argument was that the individual activities of departments, whether military, 
diplomatic or defence could not succeed in isolation; instead they had to be 
conducted as a part of a comprehensive plan so that they supported and reinforced 
one another.128 
 
 
3.2 Terminology  
 
 In international peace operations, the terminology for coordination is far less 
convoluted than domestic coordination. Unlike the variegated terms used to denote 
the models of coordination in domestic governance, the literature shows that 
coordination in international peace missions has been limited to several main 
concepts. These include: 
 
                                               
126 Ibid.    Addendum 2.2. 
127 Phil Goff, "Meeting the Challenges of Security and Development" (27 June, 2005), available at 
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/meeting+challenges+security+and+development, (accessed 21 
September 2010). 
128 Peter Viggo Jakobsen A Work in Slow Progress: Nato’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis 
Response Operations (DIIS Report 2008:15, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2008)  available 
at http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports%202008/Report_2008-
15_NATO_Comprehensive_Approach_Crisis_Response_Operations.pdf  3. 
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• the Integrated Approach and Integrated Missions concepts developed by the 
United Nations in the late 1990s and early 2000s,129  
• NATO’s effects based approach to operations (EBO),130 
• the Comprehensive Approach by the European Union and NATO,131  and,  
• the Whole-of-Government approach.132 
 
An analysis of the literature suggests that by 2010 the whole of government 
approach had become the most widely used definition for intra-governmental 
coordination of peace missions. Cedric Coning and Karsten Friis explained that WGA 
“takes place within a specific country. The purpose is to harmonise the efforts of the 
various government agencies, for more rational use of resources and to contribute to 
multinational-level efforts.”133   
 
Cedric Coning argued that the UN’s Integrated Approach defined a wider 
multilateral context. He stressed that it “is an effort to achieve whole-of-government 
coherence among the members of the UN family.”134 He claimed that it serves as a 
                                               
129 See: Espen Barth Eide et al. Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and 
Recommendations (Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group, May 2005)  available 
at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-
A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=28276, Cedric de Coning The United Nations and the Comprehensive 
Approach (DIIS Report 2008:14, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2008)  available at 
http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports%202008/Report-2008-
14_The_United_Nations_and_the_Comprehensive_Approach.pdf. 
130 Ståle Ulriksen Niels Nagelhus Schia Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations (A 
Discussion paper for MNE5, A Publication in the NUPI Series on Security in Practice, 2007)  available at 
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/NUPI_multidimensionalandintegratedpeaceops.pdf 
(accessed 23 January 2011). 
131 Eva Gross The Eu and the Comprehensive Approach (DIIS Report 2008:13, Danish Institute for 
International Studies, 2008)  available at 
http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports%202008/R2008-
13_EU_and_the_Comprehensive_Approach.pdf, Jakobsen A Work in Slow Progress: Nato’s 
Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Response Operations. The New Zealand Defence Force also refers 
to the ‘Comprehensive Approach’, see: Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine (NZDDP–D)  
(Development Branch, Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force, November 2008)  available at 
http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/public-docs/2008/nzddp-d-2008-ed-2.pdf. 
132 For a survey of global whole of government approaches see: David Lanz (swisspeace) Simon J A 
Mason (CSS) Towards a Swiss “Whole of Government” Approach in Sudan: 2005-2008 (Swiss 
Background Paper 3C Conference 2009, Center for Security Studies (ETH Zurich) and Swisspeace, 
2009)  available at 
http://www.swisspeace.ch/typo3/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/publications_by_staff/Swiss-WGA-in-Sudan-
18Mar09.pdf, Helge Lurås Cedric de Coning, Niels Nagelhus Schia and Ståle Ulriksen Norway’s Whole-
of-Government Approach and Its Engagement with Afghanistan (Security in Practice 8 · 2009 [NUPI 
Report], Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Department of Security and Conflict Management, 
2009)  available at http://english.nupi.no/Publications/Books-and-reports/2009/Norway-s-Whole-of-
Government-Approach-and-its-Engagement-with-Afghanistan, US Department of State A Whole-of-
Government Approach to Prevent, Resolve, and Transform Conflict, Fact Sheet: Office of the 
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, available at 
http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/nss/state/71036.pdf, (accessed 21 September), Colonel M.P. 
Jorgensen, "A Strategy for Effective Peace-Building: Canada's Whole-of-Government Approach in 
Afghanistan" (Canadian Forces College, 2008). 
133 Cedric de Coning and Karsten Friis, "How to Conceptualise ‘Comprehensive Approach’?," in 
Comprehensive Approach: Challenges and Opportunities in Complex Crisis Management, (ed). Karsten 
Friis and Pia Jarmyr (Oslo: Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt (NUPI), 2008), 2. 
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“catalyst for agency coherence among the individual members of the UN system” and 
provides a “focal point for the facilitation of external coherence among the various 
agencies”.135 The Integrated Mission concept is the physical manifestation of the 
integrated approach.136 An example is the United Nations Integrated Mission in 
Timor-Leste (UNMIT), which was established in 2006.  
 
The term comprehensive approach (CA) has much in common with the UN’s 
Integrated Approach. It is a wider notion encapsulating the various models and 
mechanisms aimed at enhancing overall coherence, cooperation and coordination 
across various agencies, governments and organisations. Coning posited that the 
“term ‘comprehensive approach’ is used … as an umbrella concept for all such 
initiatives.”137 Exemplifying the difficulty in pinning down one authoritative definition, 
the New Zealand Defence Force’s (NZDF) 2008 Foundations of New Zealand Military 
Doctrine (NZDDP–D) provided the following definition:138 
 
The Comprehensive Approach is an extension of the Whole of Government 
Approach. It is a conceptual framework that recognises that solutions to most 
crises involve the application of more than one element of national power. 
However, the Comprehensive Approach also embraces the fact than in the current 
complex security environment relevant non-governmental organisations also have 
a part to play in achieving lasting solutions. 
 
Critically, and possibly somewhat contrary to common perceptions, it was the military 
in New Zealand which reinforced the importance of the inclusion of non-
governmental organisations into the coordination spectrum. Their interpretation 
provides that the comprehensive approach is effectively a whole-of-government 
approach incorporating non-government organisations. However, the NZDF fail to 
define whether their interpretation stretches to include the relationships with other 
governments and foreign NGOs. If it does not, then it is somewhat narrower than 
Coning’s definition.  
 
However, as of 2011, this definition of the comprehensive approach is yet to 
take hold in New Zealand outside of defence circles – which in-itself demonstrates 
the difficulty in developing effective cross-government coordination.139 This is salient, 
                                               
135 Ibid. 
136 See: Ibid.   3. 
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138 Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine (NZDDP–D)    2-7, footnote 6. 
139 Several speeches in 2004 and 2007, one from the Prime Minister and the others from Minister’s of 
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as the use of whole of government terminology significantly fails to incorporate non-
government entities into the policy and service delivery cycle. In Australia, this gap 
has been recognised and is being addressed by incorporating experienced non-
government practitioners into quasi-government departments – such as the Asia-
Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence in Queanbeyan, NSW.140 
 
The effects-based operations concept, which began in the 1990s, is an 
offshoot of network-centric warfare and is a purely military concept. With EBO the 
military looks to exploit the asymmetric advantages in knowledge, precision and 
mobility.141 Military activities, for example, could include use of kinetic force, but also 
may include a number of non-kinetic military actions. Actions encompass operations 
“in peace, crisis, and war,” not just combat.142 This approach helps conceptualise the 
enemy as a system, which is characterised as being complex and adaptive.143 In a 
literature survey on the subject, Major Z. Jobbagy has observed that:144 
 
Since the successful 1991 Gulf War the US Air Force in every military operation has 
been applied under an effects-based operating concept that emphasises the 
accomplishment of strategic goals. Warfare in the context of EBO allows us to think 
about ways other than just simple destroy the enemy’s forces. EBO is about 
accomplishing the objective via effects we want to achieve. This difference in mind-set 
frees up resources and minimises damage and loss of life. EBO is the definite 
springboard to accomplish security goals and objectives in an integrated, unified 
fashion by better linking all security pillars together. 
 
The concept takes a systems thinking approach, as does the whole-of-government 
approach. However, the concept is military centric and would not naturally stretch to 
incorporate civilian organisations. 
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3.3 International Whole of Government Approaches 
 
To examine coordination in these operational environments it is useful to 
focus on individual national efforts. Several governments have been working on 
increased coordination among departments involved in international operations. The 
United Kingdom and Canada led the way in the development of integrated 
approaches to peace support operations. Many other nations have since begun to 
develop iterations of these approaches, with an expanding literature hard on their 
heels in attempting to analyse their relevant weaknesses and strengths. The 
following briefly outlines the basic whole of government approaches of New 
Zealand’s closer security partners: the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United 
States of America. It will then turn to a closer look at Australia’s enhanced focus on 
civil-military relations amongst an energised whole-of-government approach to peace 
operations.  
 
 
3.3.1 The United Kingdom, Canada & the United States 
 
Of the main actors implementing these approaches, the UK has been at the 
“forefront of conceiving and adopting integrated policy responses to weak and failing 
states.”145 The UK began developing this approach in the late 1990s. However, the 
first institutional manifestation was the creation of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
Unit (PCRU) in 2004, which was later re-named the Stabilisation Unit.146 The 
Stabilisation Unit was set up to respond to the complex challenges of “fragile and 
conflict-afflicted states”, and to help countries enhance their capacity for self-
governance.147 The Unit reports to the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development and 
includes staff from each of the Departments. It was set up to ensure that decisions 
and policies were developed and collectively agreed upon by the three 
                                               
145 See: Brown Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts?: Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to 
Fragile States   9, Major Will Anderson, 'Wiring up Whitehall: Ensuring Effective Cross –Departmental 
Activity,' Journal of Security Sector Management 3, no. 3 (2005), Finn Stepputat Integrated National 
Approaches to International Operations: The Cases of Denmark, UK, and the Netherlands (DIIS Report 
2009:14, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2009)  available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=EB06339B-2726-928E-0216-1B3F15392DD8&lng=en&id=99492. 
146 Friis, "How to Conceptualise ‘Comprehensive Approach’?," 4. 
147 The Stabilisation Unit About Us, The Stabilisation Unit available at 
http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/index.php/about-us, (accessed 23 September 2010). 
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departments.148 Finn Stepputat praised the creation of this unit, stating that it “fills a 
critical gap between the departments.”149 However, Stepputat notes that one of its 
main challenges is the limit of its power at director level, “which has the consequence 
‘that it has nobody to impress or depress’”.150  
 
In addition to the Stabilisation Unit, the UK House of Commons announced on 
15 December 2009 that a “1,000-strong civilian capability (of whom 200 can be 
deployed at any one time) has been developed ahead of schedule.”151 Called the ‘UK 
Civilian Stabilisation Group’, their stated Mission is to co-ordinate and support cross-
government stabilisation planning and execution; to ensure the rapid and integrated 
delivery of targeted expertise in a cross-government approach; and, to lead on 
stabilisation lesson-learning and assist with implementation.152 This is a firm step 
forward in recognising the requirement for civilian expertise in peace operations and 
actively building the capability to deploy them. 
 
The Canadians are regarded as the first to develop the ‘3D’ concept 
(diplomacy, development and defence). The rationale for this approach was voiced in 
Canada’s 2005 International Policy Statement.153 While all departments involved 
never officially adopted the statement, it demonstrated the initial political will to move 
towards more integrated responses to PSOs.154 Like the UK, Canada also mandated 
the development of a civilian deployment pool in the form of the Canadian 
Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START). The official website outlines 
that “START is working to expand Canada’s whole-of-government capacity for 
deploying civilian experts to fragile states. This includes the management of the 
Canadian Police Arrangement (CPA) and the deployment of other Government of 
Canada expertise.”155 Recent indications demonstrate that by 2010 the WGA has 
become an integral component of Canada’s involvement in PSOs.156  
                                               
148 For discussion see: Stepputat Integrated National Approaches to International Operations: The 
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The OECD peer review of Canada’s development assistance was high in 
praise for Canada’s whole-of-government approach to fragile states.157 The Review 
highlighted that “Canada’s 2005 International Policy Statement broke new ground 
with an entirely new approach to Canada’s international development assistance”.158 
The 2005 statement outlined Canada’s first “integrated, or whole-of-government, 
approach, bringing together diplomatic, defence, development, trade and investment 
strategies.”159 The approach has been applied in Canada’s peace support operations 
in Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan. The introduction to the Peer Review stressed 
that:160 
 
Global peace and security is a defining element of Canada’s foreign policy … In fragile 
states and countries in conflict, the whole-of-government approach is bringing together 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Department of 
National Defence and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) with 
some success. The approach is the outcome of a government-wide shared view and 
holds significant potential for policy coherence and co-ordinated programming across 
Canada’s federal departments and agencies.  
 
The Review recommended that it would like Canada to share lessons and good 
practice from implementing that approach into its programming in fragile states. They 
specifically noted the successes in Haiti illustrating that “collaboration across diverse 
organisational cultures can succeed and can be carried further with targeted 
corporate incentives.”161 
 
However, the Review found there were some gaps that required attention. 
One of those was a lack of an overarching national strategy or framework for these 
operations:162 
 
Canada needs an overall framework for policy coherence for development to make 
policies consistent and underpin Canada’s whole-of-government approach. Such a 
framework should involve all relevant departments and agencies.  
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A further issue was that of policy coherence, the Review recommended that:163 
 
Canada needs to articulate its approach to policy coherence for development to 
implement the whole-of-government approach more systematically, involving all 
relevant departments and agencies.  
 
The Review demonstrated that Canada has firmly embedded the notion of whole-of-
government into its offshore peace operations. It found that the way this had been 
done was highly effective, although a few weaknesses were present in the overall 
framework for such operations which led to some issues with policy coherence. 
 
 The US on the other hand lagged behind the UK and Canada in developing 
an integrated, whole of government approache to respond to complex operations.164 
Patrick and Brown outlined that US engagement with fragile states was “motivated 
almost entirely by national security concerns.”165 This was reinforced by the 
overwhelming influence of the US Department of Defence on White House thinking. 
This was most apparent in Iraq in 2003 as Washington transferred complete 
responsibility for the post-conflict phase to the Department of Defense.166 The turmoil 
that followed – including the breakdown of law and order, the disintegration of public 
services and the development of a full-scale insurgency clearly demonstrated the 
need to develop robust integrated responses to post-conflict complex 
environments.167  
 
 In response, the US State Department in August 2004 formed the Office of 
the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). While this was a 
positive institutional step, it lacked appropriate resources, had inadequate authority 
over active operations, met bureaucratic resistance and entered into a list of intra-
agency rivalries.168 In a 2008 Report written by Officers at the United States Marine 
Corps, Command and Staff College, it was argued that: “While the Department of 
Defense has worked diligently toward developing necessary capabilities and skill 
sets, the U.S. lacks a “whole of government” approach. This failure to fully integrate 
operations and requirements erodes America’s ability to conduct foreign missions.”169 
                                               
163 Ibid.   13. 
164 Brown Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts?: Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile 
States   31. 
165 Ibid.   32. 
166 Ibid.   38. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid. 
169 RD Harris and BR Lewis The Failure of Future U.S. Stability Operations Fueled by Flawed Strategic 
Policies (United States Marine Corps,Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Combat Development 
Callum Martin 
36 
 
 
 With the Obama administration entering office in 2009 the focus turned 
towards enhancing the civilian capacity in post conflict operations. In this pursuit, 
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton launched the Quadrennial Diplomacy and 
Development Review (QDDR) in July 2009 with the goal of “strengthening and 
elevating diplomacy and development cooperation as key pillars of U.S. foreign 
policy”.170 This was taking place in the context of calls by Defense Secretary Robert 
Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Mike Mullen to enhance civilian capabilities 
in order to avoid the “militarisation” of U.S. foreign policy.171 Gates had stated in the 
Defense Department's January 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report 
that, “The Department supports institutionalizing whole-of-government approaches to 
addressing national security challenges.”172 The document added that, “The desired 
end state is for U.S. Government national security partners to develop plans and 
conduct operations from a shared perspective.”173 It remains to be seen whether the 
US can implement robust whole of government reform or whether the existing 
institutional challenges will prevent any substantial, long-term change.174 
 
 
3.3.2 Australia 
 
 Along with the UK and Canada, Australia has been a leader in developing 
whole of government strategies towards peace support operations.175 The October 
2002 Bali bombings provided strong motivation for Canberra to place regional 
development at the top of its security agenda.176 This further contributed to the 
development of the notion of the so-called “arc of instability” which heavily influenced 
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Canberra’s national security policy.177 The 2002 Ministerial Statement Australian Aid: 
Investing in Growth, Stability and Prosperity raised these issues, affirmimg, “The 
Australian aid program is playing an increasingly important role in whole of 
government efforts to respond to these critical issues.”178  
 
This undoubtedly provided the conceptual underpinnings of the 2003 
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). RAMSI was noted as 
being one of the “most innovative whole of government operations” to that point.179 
The mission met with initial success and leading into 2006 was hailed as a ‘model of 
best practice’.180 Restoring the rule of law was rapidly accomplished with the 
overwhelming support of the local population. Subsequent problems after the 2006 
elections, which led to violent riots in Honiara, were a clear signal that the enhanced 
coordination and integration was not sufficient and had to be deepened and 
widened.181 
 
 In 2004, Sinclair Dinnen, reviewing the new development engagements, 
found that “More bits of the Australian government are now involved in development 
assistance than at any previous time in recent years.”182 However, Dinnen held a 
level of apprehension about the whole of government approach, stating, “It is also an 
approach that unless handled with sensitivity and skill could easily generate 
resentment and resistance among local officials.”183 Dinnen observed that issues of 
coordination were critical, if not only to “avoid reproducing Canberra’s bureaucratic 
rivalries in Port Moresby or Honiara”.184 By 2004, the Australian Prime Minister’s 
Office had taken a leading role in the development and steering of Australia’s policy 
engagements in the region.185 Dinnen claimed that one undesirable outcome of this 
was that officials lacking extensive regional and development experience were 
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making key decisions.186 This may have contributed to the subsequent problems in 
Honiara in 2006. 
 
 By 2007, the literature shows that at least at the rhetorical level the whole of 
government approach had been widely embraced by Australian agencies. In 2006, 
the Australian government published the White Paper on their overseas aid program: 
Australian Aid: Promoting Growth and Stability.187 This White Paper was the most 
comprehensive Australian document to articulate the links between regional security, 
stability and development. It was developed with extensive consultation between the 
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the Prime Minister’s 
office, the cabinet, AusAID, and the Treasury department, as well as input from 
Australian NGOs.188 The document emphasised that Canberra would endeavour to 
further integrate and broaden Australian engagement in development in the Asia–
Pacific region. This would be achieved through a focus on policy coherence and 
whole-of-government approaches to aid delivery, and by broadening participation 
beyond government.189 While the 2006 White Paper frequently used the term “whole 
of government” (11 times), according to Patrick and Brown, it failed to address the 
need for a whole-of-government approach covering the “entire range of foreign policy 
and overseas aid.”190 Indeed, they noted that by 2007 there was still a substantial 
distance in translating the “policy coherence rhetoric into practice.”191 
 
In 2008, the Australian Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade published a 417-page analysis of Australia’s involvement in 
peacekeeping operations (PKOs). Within this Report, the Committee evaluated the 
whole of government activities of the Australian government.192 The committee's two 
key overarching recommendations were directed at developing and improving the 
Australian whole-of-government policy and coordination of engagement in 
peacekeeping.193 They observed that despite the ‘dramatic changes’ in Australia’s 
PKOs, particularly often as a lead country in the region, “there is no policy document 
that presents a whole-of-government approach to peacekeeping”, concluding, “The 
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committee believes that it is time for such a document.”194 In addition, the committee 
listed a wide number of recommendations for the government, many related to 
deepening whole of government approaches to these operations.  
 
The Australian Senate Standing Committee provided an examination of the 
coordination between agencies in peacekeeping operations. At the strategic level, 
they noted that Australia’s peacekeeping engagements are developed on a case-by-
case basis.195 The following formal mechanisms are used to formulate whole-of-
government policy and to coordinate Australia’s involvement in peacekeeping 
operations:196 
 
• the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC) and the Secretaries Committee on 
National Security (SCONS) provide policy direction and development; 
 
• the Strategic Policy Coordination Group (SPCG) at the deputy secretary level provides 
strategic oversight and direction across agencies; and, 
 
• standing interdepartmental committees (IDCs) address specific peacekeeping 
operation issues. 
 
The Prime Minister chairs the NSC, which sets policy. It is placed at the highest level 
of government and meets regularly – on a daily basis if required. The SPCG includes 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet and the Department of Defence as the core agencies. It is 
chaired by PM&C, but any member of the committee may call a meeting if required. 
The SPCG committee meets on a monthly basis, although more frequently if 
required.197 The interdepartmental committees provide the whole-of-government 
framework for policy formulation and coordination of an individual peace support 
operation.  
 
While Australia’s policy and organisational framework appears to have been 
well designed, the Senate Report identified that there were several key weaknesses. 
Part VI of the report notes that: 
 
• government agencies and the government as a whole do not have effective 
processes for converting lessons from a peacekeeping operation into policy or 
practice—due in large measure to inadequate evaluation mechanisms, particularly 
the absence of effective performance indicators; 
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• current reporting practices can be improved to provide greater transparency and 
accountability—indeed the fragmentary reporting on Australia's engagement in 
peacekeeping provides an incomplete account of these activities;  
• there is a compelling argument for a white paper on Australia's engagement in 
peacekeeping; and  
• considerable scope exists to make the Asia–Pacific Centre on Civil–Military 
Cooperation an internationally recognised institute and for it to have an integral 
role in developing a culture of learning and improvement in those involved in 
peacekeeping. 
 
In what appeared to be an ambitious response to some of the concerns raised by the 
Senate Report, there has been a significant push by Australia to increase the 
effectiveness and efficiency of their whole-of-government working. Two of the 
primary methods for delivering this have been the enhanced focus of the Asia-Pacific 
Civil-Military Centre of Excellence and the National Security College (NSC). Both 
institutions are aimed at increasing Australia’s whole-of-government security 
approach. At the launch of the NSC in April 2010, Australia’s Prime Minister Kevin 
Rudd, said “the National Security College at ANU will enhance collaborative 
leadership in the national security community and build trusted networks within and 
outside government.”198 The Founding Director of the College, Professor Michael 
L’Estrange explained that, “Our aim is to build up the analytic skills and collaborative 
leadership attitudes among the members of the national security community in 
government, and to provide a range of academic courses and research which will be 
accessible for people inside and outside government.”199 The NSC is a deliberate 
attempt by central government to drive culture change throughout the Australian (and 
New Zealand) security sector. Under no illusions of the resistance that it will 
inevitably receive, the government has quite intentionally placed ‘heavy hitters’ on the 
NSC Board to demonstrate their determination to succeed.200  
 
  
3.4 Benefits 
 
Chapter Two highlighted that many governments had recognised the benefits 
of integrated whole-of-government approaches in domestic governance. This greatly 
assisted in stimulating the development of initiatives to handle the gradual 
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convergence of the diplomatic, defence and development policy agendas in peace 
support operations.201   
 
A 2009 paper by the Swiss Centre for Security Studies provided an additional 
pragmatic argument for a coherent whole-of-government approach. They referred to 
their mission in Sudan, noting that any commitment by Swiss agencies was seen as 
inherently “Swiss”.202 Therefore, successes or failures by any individual Swiss 
agency reflected on and influenced all other Swiss agencies involved. Consequently, 
there was “an inherent interest in coordination and mutual assistance towards 
enhancing the overall performance of all agencies.”203 This is a very useful 
benchmark for what New Zealand has recently been attempting to construct within 
the so-called “NZ Inc framework for offshore operations”.204 What will be seen in 
Chapter 7 is that the focus for ‘NZ Inc’, which is driven by the New Zealand Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, is inherently trade focused and has yet to be fully 
exploited in peace support operations. 
  
 Based on the literature, this thesis argues that aside from a ‘singular brand’ 
noted above, there are specific benefits that a whole-of-government approach can 
bring to peace support operations. These mirror the benefits drawn from the literature 
on domestic implementation of the concept. Namely, there are four overarching 
advantages – the reduction of departmental silos, increasing policy coherence, 
maximising efficiency, and addressing complex social problems.  
 
 
3.4.1 Reduction of Departmental Silos 
 
 The silozation of the security sector is perhaps more noticeable than that of 
the remainder of the public sector. This is largely due to the stark difference between 
disciplined and non-disciplined forces. Militaries are by their nature hierarchical and 
risk adverse – especially in the protection of information. This has manifested itself in 
entrenched cultures that are somewhat guarded towards the media and not 
predisposed to working collaboratively with civilian agencies. As the nature of the 
operating environment has evolved in the past few decades, militaries have begun to 
                                               
201 Anderson, 'Wiring up Whitehall: Ensuring Effective Cross –Departmental Activity,' 2. 
202 Simon J A Mason (CSS) Towards a Swiss “Whole of Government” Approach in Sudan: 2005-2008   
1. 
203 Ibid. 
204 See Chapter 5. 
Callum Martin 
42 
 
grapple with the realisation that they need to work in intimate partnerships with 
civilian agencies.205 
 
Almost fortuitously, the recent increase of police being deployed alongside 
defence forces has rapidly begun to break down the barriers. This has seen its 
difficulties even though police, as disciplined forces, are much more closely related 
than development agencies for example. There is a growing literature on the 
collaboration between militaries and police in these operations. As was highlighted in 
the Australian Senate Report:206 
 
To this stage, the committee has looked at [Police and Military] training as though each 
organisation operated as a silo, as a distinct entity with separate training and pre-
deployment programs. Today's peacekeeping operations, however, with their 
multidimensional and multifaceted nature, require coordination and cooperation 
between the different elements of a peacekeeping operation: 
 
The report posits that although the police and defence forces have distinct functions 
in a peace support operation, they may need to support and rely on each other to 
achieve the mission's objective. Addressing the Panel, Lieutenant General Gillespie 
stated with reference to operations in Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands that:207 
 
Then, as now, most military patrols will have a policeman with them so that powers in 
terms of law and order for arrest and detention remain where they should be, which is 
with the police force. If you are trying to bring a nation along to be a law-abiding nation, 
it ought to learn that police do policing and that the military are about something else.  
 
The message that Lt Gen Gillespie put across was that each department has their 
specific roles but will often occupy the same space. Thus, interoperability between 
the two forces is critical. Lt Gen Gillespie stressed that, rather than develop identical 
skills, their efforts should be directed at “ensuring there are no security capability 
gaps.”208 This has been a useful development as Australia, like New Zealand, looks 
to develop its effectiveness in peace support operations. The next step is drawing on 
these experiences and using them to break down the silos between militaries and the 
growing number of civilian agencies involved in such operations.  
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3.4.2 Policy Coherence 
 
An efficient whole-of-government approach to peace support operations will 
necessarily reflect policy coherency amongst stakeholder agencies. The case studies 
in the 2006 OECD report Whole-of-Government Approaches to Fragile States 
identified that governments, “recognised the need for, and the benefits of, WGAs.”209 
The report found that the main benefits flowed from ensuring coherency in policies 
across the various agencies. The report argued that whole-of-government 
approaches need to “go beyond providing a collection of independent policies guided 
by departmental mandates.”210 The report also stressed that coherent policies and 
activities should have greater legitimacy in the eyes of recipient states and as a result 
be more likely to receive a positive response.211  
 
However, Brown et al provided strong argument that there is much work to be 
done to achieve policy coherence in peace operations. They highlight that 
governments often avoid honest debate over the goals of policy coherence in peace 
operations, in part because they are reluctant to confront the “divergent motivations 
for their efforts.”212 The benefit of policy coherence is to join-up the unique resources 
and skills of various departments in addressing security and governance obstacles to 
development in these operations.213  
 
 
3.4.3 Efficiency 
 
A coherent whole-of-government approach enables the exploitation of 
synergies, such as through information-sharing, joint analysis, activities that 
complement each other, and sharing the costs of infrastructure.214 The OECD report 
reasoned that the advantages of enhanced policy coherence amongst a whole-of-
government approach in peace operations were clear: 215 
 
… more coherent policies and activities can contribute to the overall objective of 
long-term development and stability in fragile states at a lower overall fiscal cost. In 
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addition, the risk of these objectives either being compromised, or simply not being 
met, is reduced.  
 
In an environment strongly driven by the global effects of the economic crisis, 
governments are increasingly looking to leverage the most value from their 
engagements abroad. The OECD has identified that while there are significant ‘front-
end’ costs involved with joining-up, the long-term economic benefits will far outweigh 
the short-term loss.216 As these relationships and experiences develop, there will be 
an identification of where governments can exponentially increase value for money. 
 
 
3.4.4 Addressing Complexity in Peace Support Operations 
 
 A fundamental feature of contemporary peacekeeping is the complexity of the 
operating environment. Indeed, the New Zealand government labels the operations 
in Afghanistan, Timor-Leste, and Solomon Islands as ‘complex peace support 
operations’.217 The OECD report argued that, “attempts to deal with precarious states 
have proven quite complex and problematic.”218 The report described that 
development agencies realise that successful long-term development in fragile states 
is impossible when these states cannot deliver the collective requirements of basic 
security and effective governance. Furthermore, both development and military 
agencies are patently aware that short-term, ad hoc responses in which national and 
international policies lack coherence and co-ordination will not succeed. As a result, 
the focus has now turned to improving peace building capacities through better 
whole-of-government operational responses. As with domestic governance however, 
there are a number of key barriers to successful implementation of a whole-of-
government approach. 
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3.5 Barriers 
 
 The literature shows that there are some key challenges to effective whole-of-
government implementation in peace support operations. Providing overview of these 
challenges, the OECD report emphasised that:219 
 
Overall, the challenge to most of these partnerships is that they have comparatively 
little history. For the practitioners involved, most activities therefore have a pioneering 
character in which actors are still adapting to each others idiosyncrasies, arising from 
differing organisational cultures, professional skills sets, mandates and legal statutes. 
These are then compounded by a lack of consensus or clarity over roles and 
responsibilities of each partner and lines of accountability. 
 
The report provides a coherent list of the primary challenges that arose from their 
case studies. Those challenges included the importance of political interests and 
priorities as well as the constitutional and political context of a donor country. There 
is an additional requirement to balance diverse rationales and perspectives of actors 
involved, as well as to clarify their roles in order to establish who takes the lead. 
There is a requirement to bridge differences in organisational culture among actors. 
In addition, the lack of incentives for departments to work collaboratively with each 
other needs to be addressed. They argue that often there are strong disincentives to 
work in close partnership with other government agencies. The whole-of-government 
approach can have substantial resource implications in both financial and human 
terms. The Report stressed that in many cases donor governments had not matched 
their ambitions for an integrated approach with sufficient resources.220 
 
 The barriers identified by the OECD highlight that there are specific structural 
issues that challenge the implementation of a whole-of-government approach. Brown 
et al emphasise that a high-level remit from the government is essential to generate 
momentum for interdepartmental collaboration.221 Finn Stepputat drew a set of 
challenges from his analysis on UK whole-of-government efforts. These included: 222 
 
• Lack of an agreed general plan 
• Lack of agreed cross-governmental planning format 
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• Lack of agreed persons or organizations with the overarching responsibility to lead and 
drive the process of cross-governmental coordination forward. 
 
There is an inherent difficulty in gaining cross-departmental collaboration and buy-in 
when they have competing interests and varying raisons d’être.  In this respect, 
concerns have been expressed that a whole-of-government approach can be 
misused as an excuse to interfere in and instrumentalise other agencies for goals 
outside their mandate.223 In addition, it can lead to a diffusion of responsibility and a 
confusion of roles as well as additional bureaucratisation and excessive coordination 
costs.224  This ties in with the enhanced difficulties in accurately delineating lines of 
accountability and responsibility.  
 
 A further challenge, and possibly the greatest, is the clash of institutional 
cultures. Studies illustrate that there is a lack of knowledge about organisational 
identities, traditions, images, cultures, and fundamental goals that constitute and 
constrain their activities in peace support operations.225 Michael Pugh has noted that 
a key obstacle to closer cooperation in multinational and interagency cooperation is 
“the sheer scale and fragmentation of actors, activities, and perceptions in the civilian 
sector.”226 Benjamin and de Carvalho argued that stereotyping and prejudices due to 
lack of knowledge and information represent root obstacles to civil-military 
cooperation.227 They claimed that another overall challenge “is lack of knowledge 
about one another’s security concerns.”228 They contend that for civilian actors, the 
threat of becoming a target in the conflict sometimes makes cooperation with the 
military necessary. The circular argument comes in that working with the military 
could also make the civilians legitimate targets.  
 
A critical dilemma for militaries is the security risk connected with sharing 
operational information with civilian actors. Civilian personnel at times have been 
accused of being too naïve about the security risks in conflict areas, and have been 
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criticised for refusing to cooperate with military structures.229 The last challenge 
outlined by Benjamin and de Carvalho was the relevant actors’ lack of knowledge 
about one another’s diverging working procedures in the planning, action, and 
assessment-phases of an operation.230 On top of these fundamental issues, there 
are natural issues with the divergent languages and operational terminologies used 
by the varying agencies.  
 
 
3.6 Conditions and Factors 
 
Drawing on the above benefits and barriers, there is an opportunity to 
delineate a set of overarching factors and conditions required to implement a 
successful whole-of-government approach to peace support operations.  
 
The first requirement is a national strategy for managing whole-of-government 
engagement in peace support operations. Such a framework would consist of three 
elements: 
 
1. A clear understanding of the rationale for engagement in peace 
support operations, which is shared by all relevant government 
actors; 
2. a joint policy statement explaining the underlying principle for 
collaborative working in these operations, together with the 
outcomes and how these will be achieved; and 
3. a commitment to establish an effective dialogue between the key 
actors involved in a whole-of-government approach, and to work on 
bridging differences in organisational cultures. 231  
 
The framework would provide early engagement of all relevant actors (including 
those at the field level) and classify their roles and objectives in a whole-of-
government approach.  
 
 In addition to a national whole-of-government framework for peace support 
operations, there is a requirement for country specific whole-of-government 
strategies. This reflects the notion illustrated in the literature that there is no ‘one size 
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fits all’ approach to these missions. The success of such a framework requires the 
highest level of political commitment. If possible, the process should be driven at the 
Prime Ministerial level and engages the relevant ministers within a whole-of 
government-approach.232 
 
 Whole-of-government approach is also made difficult by the disruption to the 
lines of accountability. Successful implementation will depend on cross-departmental 
accountability to be collectively designed and continually monitored. Flowing from 
this is a requirement for accurate and ongoing indicators of success.  
 
 There is also a requirement to drive culture change across the relevant 
government departments. The Australian National Security College is a useful 
example of an attempt to drive high-level culture change through the introduction of 
Executive Development courses to improve the ability to operate in a collaborative 
manner.233 A further method to drive this change is strategic use of performance 
management and reviews to provide tangible benefits to work across boundaries.  
 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
 There has been a concerted effort in the past decade to achieve better results 
and enhance the value of the combined contributions to peace support operations. 
The United Kingdom and Canada led the way in researching and developing 
methods to increase coordination and collaboration between civilian and military 
components. Canada’s ‘Three D’s’ approach was an early example of a desire to 
provide more efficient and effective management of Canada’s increasing presence in 
such operations. Australia was also an early advocate of the requirement to place 
civilians into the forefront of operations as demonstrated by the Police-led mission in 
Solomon Islands. Australia has reinforced the desire to leverage enhanced value of 
its offshore operations by the development of two world-leading institutions in the 
Civil-Military Centre of Excellence and the National Security College. These 
ambitious Centres, which are inherently designed to drive culture change across the 
whole-of-government, are strong indicators that Australia has invested in this 
concept. 
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 The benefits of taking a whole-of-government approach to these operations 
have been well publicised. This includes the reduction of departmentalism, 
consistency of policy across departments as well as increased efficiency and an 
opportunity to identify and exploit synergies. Moreover, it is argued that this can all be 
achieved in complex operating environments. While this may be accurate, there are 
some overwhelming difficulties faced when attempting to construct such an 
approach. The structural issues of who takes the lead and who is therefore 
responsible, or where additional resources will come from are difficult – though these 
can be addressed in the short-term with effective management. The more complex 
issues however, are less to do with machinery of government and more to do with 
institutional cultures. In order to institute an efficient and effective whole-of-
government approach in the security sector, as with all sectors, there is a necessity 
to drive culture change across government departments tasked with national 
security. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter 4: The Whole-of-Government Approach in 
New Zealand 
 
 
This chapter aims to critically review the New Zealand literature on the whole-
of-government approach. It will examine how and why the approach was 
incorporated into New Zealand public sector reform. It will then look to outline the 
impact of the approach in domestic affairs. This chapter’s rationale is that the 
domestic whole-of-government experience is instructive for the use of the approach 
in peace support operations. In this respect, value can be added to New Zealand’s 
peace support operations by building on the experiences of domestic 
implementation. Moreover, value is gained from an understanding of not only how the 
concept operates domestically in New Zealand; but how it is implemented in the 
previous two chapters. It is only then that a detailed picture can be presented with 
which to evaluate New Zealand’s whole-of-government approach to peace support 
operations. 
 
 
 
4.1 New Zealand Public Sector Reform  
 
 New Zealand was not alone in implementing the new public management 
reforms of the 1980’s and 1990’s. The difference was the width and breadth of the 
domestic reforms. Jonathan Boston and Chris Eichbaum observed in 2005 that since 
the mid-1980s, those reforms attracted world-wide recognition, interest and 
commendation:234 
 
Regarded as the most radical, comprehensive and innovative example of the ‘new 
public management’, the ‘New Zealand model’ has been closely scrutinised by 
reformist governments in numerous developed and developing countries and has 
inspired many of the public management changes during the past two decades 
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As New Zealand moved away from those reforms, there was an increased focus 
towards policy outcomes as opposed to solely benchmarking policy on narrowly 
defined outputs. Moreover, outcomes would form the foundation of and be clearly 
articulated as policy was designed rather than based on an aggregation of outputs 
after the fact.235 
 
 In 2001, the Clark Labour Government commissioned a review of the public 
management system. A Ministerial Advisory Group, including Public Service chief 
executives, external commentators and a representative of the Public Service 
Association conducted the Review of the Centre of the New Zealand state sector 
over a four-month period in 2001.236 Their major finding was that the public 
management system, as it stood provided “a reasonable platform to work from, but 
some significant shifts in emphasis are needed to better respond to the needs of the 
future.”237 One of these shifts was designed to resolve the fragmentation of the public 
sector. This had been caused by a noted increase of agencies and the subsequent 
proliferation of Ministerial portfolios leading to an excessive number of votes. They 
also emphasised that in some areas, the weakness was caused by “an over-
emphasis on vertical accountabilities at the expense of whole of government 
approaches.”238 
 
 The Review of the Centre, however, was not the first official mention of the 
notion of the whole of government. A survey of the official literature suggests that the 
first use of the term in Parliament came within a 1999 Select Committee Report. The 
Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000, chaired by the Hon Derek Quigley, used the term 
several times when referring to procurement:239 
 
We are in no doubt that advice on major capability procurement must be based on 
whole-of-Government policies and priorities, which must take precedence over 
single-service equipment wish-lists. 
 
Quigley and the Committee rejected the ‘in-house’ nature of the formulation of 
defence policy in favour of a “whole of government” and a “whole of society” 
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approach.240 The Select Committee’s findings provided a strong base for the 
incoming Labour government’s defence policy and were broadly adopted.241  
 
 Further early official use of the concept came in the lead up to the turn of the 
century. One of the central issues was that of the so-called ‘Y2K bug’. The Minister of 
the State Services Commission, Hon Maurice Williamson, recommended a new 
committee be established, comprised of the chief executives of government agencies 
and representatives from the Y2K Commission, to respond to any incidents that may 
arise over the millennium period.242 Mr Williamson argued that the role of the 
committee would be to coordinate a “whole of government” response to such 
incidents.243 The Minister recommended that the committee should comprise 
representatives of “chief executive level” from the Prime Minister's department, 
Cabinet, the SSC, Police, the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Treasury and the Y2K 
Commission.244 
 
Another came in the nascent field of ‘e-government’.245 The Minister of State 
Services, Hon Trevor Mallard, highlighted the emerging theme in December 2000, 
where he said that:246 
 
What was made clear to me is that if government is to deliver the type of value to 
New Zealanders that they will expect in the future, we require an all-of-government 
approach to the way information and communications technologies are put to use. 
 
In fact, an article in the Waikato Times earlier that year illustrated that the term had 
already firmly entered the Minister’s thinking, "There's probably quite a bit of money 
being wasted … I do accept that there's not a decent `whole-of-government' 
perspective."”247  
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 The accomplished journalist Colin James noted an early use of the concept in 
January 2001, specifically referring to the Deputy Prime Minister (and Minister for 
Economic Development) Jim Anderton; James observed that:248 
 
This "whole of Government" approach emerged last year during development of Mr 
Anderton's cherished Tai Rawhiti project to try to reverse the East Coast's 
economic decline. He aims to transplant it into whole sectors, of which timber is 
first. 
  
An article in the New Zealand Herald dated November 4 2000 tells the story, with an 
element of uncertainty of the new concept, “Invited by Gisborne Mayor John Clarke 
to look at East Coast regional development, [Anderton] hit on a taskforce approach 
backed by the “whole-of-government.””249  
 
These combined references illustrate that the concept entered the New 
Zealand political mainstream from about 1999. By the time that the Review of the 
Centre was conducted in 2001, there was increasing use and a growing 
understanding of the concept. In this respect, the Review provided a valuable 
contribution in detailing, in plain English, the existing framework and rationale behind 
it. In doing so, it clearly delineated the inherent weaknesses in the existing system 
and provided a clearly expressed platform for public management reform. It 
promoted the whole of government approach as a desired objective across all 
government departments and firmly embedded the notion in official thinking. 
 
An underlying theme was a requirement for integrated service delivery. A 
central question for the Advisory Group was whether the State Sector was as 
effective as it should be in providing services to the community.250 Another issue that 
emerged consistently through the review was the “extent of inter-agency cooperation 
required in the delivery of some services, and the difficulty of achieving coordinated 
“whole of Government” action.”251  
 
 The following diagram taken from the RotC provides a discrete summary of 
the state as at 2001 and the new direction they believed was required.252 
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Figure 2: The nature of the changes we think are needed is as follows: 
 
 
4.2 Implementation of the Approach in New Zealand 
 
 While the Review of the Centre provided a list of recommendations for 
Government, there was recognition in the Review that it would take a degree of 
patience to develop efficient policy and practice. The Report held that to achieve 
significant change, “There are no simple solutions, or single levers that can be pulled. 
Progress will be made through finding flexible and responsive ways of working that 
reflect the particular challenges of each situation.”253 The process would require a 
certain change in official thinking in combination with in-depth research to establish 
when, where, how and why the new approach should be implemented.  
 
Since the Review, the whole of government approach has become standard 
in policy rhetoric. A Google search of “whole of government” within the New Zealand 
government domain in October 2010 drew over 15,000 hits.254 A closer analysis of 
much of the rhetoric shows that often the term has been used without clear 
description of what is meant by its use – leading some to describe a ‘gap’ between 
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executive rhetoric and reform changes in practice.255 To assess this, it is useful to 
analyse responses into two paths of action – formal and informal.  
 
 
4.2.1 Formal Responses 
 
A direct outcome of the Review of the Centre was the introduction of new and 
amending legislation. In December 2003, the Public Finance (State Sector 
Management) Bill 2003 was introduced into Parliament. The Minister of Finance at 
the time, Michael Cullen, asserted that:256 
 
The Public Finance [State Sector Management] Bill is designed to strengthen the 
public service, make it more transparent and flexible, allow a more integrated response 
to complex social problems involving a number of state agencies and invigorate the 
culture of the state sector. 
 
Bob Gregory assessed that the legislation was aimed at strengthening ‘whole of 
government’ strategic capacity, “by overcoming problems of excessive structural 
‘fragmentation and ‘siloization’, and the weakening of longer-term executive and 
managerial capability, and the attenuation of a coherent state sector ethos.”257 The 
Bill made amendments to three existing Acts (the State Sector Amendment Act 2004, 
the Public Finance Amendment Act 2004 and the State Owned Enterprises Act 2004) 
and created a new Act – the Crown Entities Act 2004. On 25 January 2005, all four 
Acts came into effect. 
 
The legislative changes were designed to strengthen integration, build 
capability and provide stronger leadership on values and standards as well as 
developing future leaders in the wider public sector.258 The Crown Entities Act was 
intended to achieve better alignment between Crown entities and government 
objectives. In addition, the new legislation was geared towards more effective whole-
of-government coordination and increased integration of Crown entities into the rest 
of the state sector.259 These changes also had an integral role in cementing the 
government’s intention to drive the whole-of-government collaboration. As will be 
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seen later, this was not restricted to domestic affairs – it was formative in the 
implementation of the approach in New Zealand’s peace support operations. 
 
Bob Gregory wrote that the changes reflected the “contemporary fascination” 
with collaborative government and argued that they would not be a panacea for the 
weaknesses of the NPM reforms. His argument stemmed from the belief that the 
political influence of the neo-liberal reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, which was 
based on the desire to reduce the ability of the state to ‘intervene’ in the social and 
economic marketplace, endured in New Zealand. He argued that the centre had 
shifted to the right because of the vulnerability of the deregulated New Zealand 
economy to globalisation and the portability of international capital.260 The 2004 
reforms, Gregory claimed, “indicated no resolve on the part of the centre-left 
government to radically reverse that intention.”261  
 
More recently, the National Government has been active in continuing the 
development of an integrated public sector. On 11 December 2010, Minister of State 
Services, Hon Tony Ryall announced the passing under urgency of the Research, 
Science and Technology Bill, the National Library of New Zealand (Te Puna 
Mātauranga o Aotearoa) Amendment Bill, and the Public Records Amendment Bill. 
Ryall argued that the legislation was “an important step towards improved service 
delivery at a reduced cost, and a more future-proofed State sector”.262 The stated 
aim of the Bill was to “amalgamate a number of existing agencies to achieve gains in 
terms of financial efficiencies, effectiveness, and future viability of agencies”.263 The 
Bills merge the Ministry of Research, Science and Technology and the Foundation 
for Research, Science and Technology into the new Ministry of Science and 
Innovation, and the National Library and Archives New Zealand into the Department 
of Internal Affairs.264 It was claimed that once the transitions were complete, the three 
structural changes (including the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and Food 
Safety Authority) would deliver approximate savings of $25 million over the period to 
2013/14.265 
 
                                               
260 Gregory, "Theoretical Faith and Practical Works: De-Autonomizing and Joining-up in the New 
Zealand State Sector," 152. 
261 Ibid. 
262 Minister of State Services Hon Tony Ryall, "State Sector Management Bill Passed" (11 December 
2010), available at http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA1012/S00207/state-sector-management-bill-
passed.htm, (accessed 02 January 2011). 
263 State Sector Management Bill 2010 193-1, Explanatory note. 
264 Hon Tony Ryall, "State Sector Management Bill Passed". 
265 Ibid. 
Chapter 4: The Whole-of-Government Approach in New Zealand 
 
57 
 
This is in direct line with the National Government’s focus on reducing 
expense of the public sector while seeking better value for money. The Research, 
Science and Technology Bill received little attention by the media although the 
structural changes were significant. The lack of media may not be surprising; the Bill 
was fully supported by all parties in parliament (except the Green Party).266 In effect, 
the changes are in line with the former Labour government’s desire to increase 
collaboration and integration in the public sector. The only disagreement from the 
opposition came in the merger of Archives New Zealand and the National Library into 
the Department of Internal Affairs. Labour stated in their Minority Report:267 
 
We believe that this merger will undermine vital components of our constitutional and 
democratic infrastructure by reducing their independence, the influence of the Chief 
Archivist and National Librarian and the confidence of the New Zealand public in these 
institutions. 
 
Labour’s opposition therefore came in a constitutional argument rather than 
opposition to the desire for increased efficiency and reduction of expense.  
 
While vastly different in content and scope, the 2004 and 2010 legislative 
changes are interesting in examining the differences in the language used to ‘sell’ the 
legislation to the public. This is salient when assessing the underlying motivation for 
government to promote a whole-of-government approach. Cullen’s 2003 press 
release spoke of ‘transparency’ and of ‘complex social problems’, as well as ‘values, 
and cultures’ – there was no mention of economic factor.268 In contrast, Ryall’s 2010 
press release referred to ‘reduced costs’, and the need to ‘deliver services in existing 
baselines’ and to ‘future proof service delivery’ – with no mention of social factors.269 
The difference between these is clear with respect to the message: the National 
government is concerned with promoting a perception of efficient economic 
management of the public sector where the Labour party was concerned with 
perception of good management of increasingly complex social issues. Of particular 
note for this thesis is that this difference in language has been replicated in New 
Zealand’s peace support operations. While there had been awareness by the 
National government of the complexity of the operating environment, there is an 
enhanced focus on ‘value for money’ in which the whole-of government approach is 
                                               
266 The Research, Science, and Technology Bill passed by 103 votes to 6 with the Greens opposing. 
The remaining bills passed by 65 to 54 with Labour and the Greens opposing. 
267 Education and Science Committee State Sector Management Bill Commentary (193-2, 2010)  
available at http://www.parliament.nz/NR/rdonlyres/D77162A7-14F0-4CAC-9BE5-
6A8E03E23BCB/170250/DBSCH_SCR_4917_StateSectorManagementBill1932_7957_.pdf (accessed 
02 January 2011) 4. 
268 Cullen, "Setting the Benchmark for Public Management". 
269 Hon Tony Ryall, "State Sector Management Bill Passed". 
Callum Martin 
58 
 
the tool of choice. Both Parties are using the same tool – though justifying that use in 
very different terms. 
 
The 2010 changes were not simply a return to rational choice economic neo-
liberalism of the 1980s. While the National Party is much more comfortable than 
Labour using the language of economics (terms like value for money, efficiency and 
cost reduction have become mantras), they are in fact much closer to the underlying 
public management theme of the previous government than may be expected. Both 
National and Labour spoke about integrated approaches to public management 
within the press releases of their structural changes. National refers to ‘outcomes’ 
rather than ‘outputs’ as established by Labour.270 Many of the recent policy changes 
by the Government have been focused towards whole-of-government reforms to 
increase efficiency.271 Justice Minister Simon Power and Maori Affairs Minister Pita 
Sharples outlined a clear example in late 2009 when announcing a whole-of-
government approach to addressing the drivers of crime:272 
 
Though responsibility for reducing crime sits with justice-sector agencies, many of the 
tools to address the drivers of crime are in other sectors, such as health, education, 
parenting support, housing, recreation, and economic, social and community 
development. 
 
The focus will be on improving outcomes by tackling fragmentation, ensuring 
ministerial and chief executive co-ordination and leadership of the work programme, 
improving value for money, and improving the relationship between government and 
the community. 
 
Aside from the economic reference to ‘value for money’, this statement could well 
have been written by Ministers in the previous Government. Focused on outcomes, it 
articulated the requirement for linkages between agencies when dealing with 
complex social issues and the need to reduce fragmentation. 
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It is clear that the National-led government is focused upon raising 
productivity and cost reduction of the public sector – though arguably that has been 
somewhat stimulated by the global financial crisis. What has not been very well 
articulated by the National government is how reducing costs and placing an 
emphasis on service delivery at the ‘front-lines’ will in-practice lead to improved 
outcomes when dealing with complex ‘wicked problems’. However, this may also be 
inherent in their argument – to focus on efficiency at the service delivery level under 
increasingly tight budgets demands closer integration and collaboration between 
departments and sectors. The question is how to move from policy to 
implementation? 
 
4.2.2 Informal Responses 
 
 In 2008, the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) at Victoria University of 
Wellington undertook a project looking into collaboration within government. The 
Better Connected Services for Kiwis incorporated both academic and practitioner 
perspectives on what was happening at the service delivery level (or ‘front lines’ in 
contemporary phrasing) in the New Zealand public sector.273 Emphasis was placed 
on the practical experience of front-line staff and managers and this was the first 
original published research in New Zealand on what is happening with interagency 
service delivery. One of the key discoveries was that ad hoc collaboration, rather 
than institutionalised frameworks, were responsible for much of the current whole of 
government activity at the service delivery level. As will be seen in the next chapter, 
the IPS findings have specific relevance to New Zealand’s whole-of-government 
approach to peace support operations.  
 
The IPS research established that there was significant support throughout 
the New Zealand public sector for increased collaboration. This was defined as not 
just ‘co-existence’ (working alone), ‘communication’ (talking together), ‘co-operation’ 
(getting together) or ‘co-ordination’ (working together), but a further step: namely 
‘collaboration’ (sharing work).274 It was contended that one mode was not inherently 
superior to the others, but that the nature of the work involved and the goal sought 
would determine which was most appropriate. However, working collaboratively was 
desirable when the so-called ‘wicked issues’ and ‘complex problems’ were being 
dealt with. In these cases the ‘standard operating procedures’ were not sufficient and 
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no one person or agency had all the knowledge or resources. The project found that, 
“since ‘no system will connect you up’, ‘the right kinds of connections with the right 
kinds of people have to be created’.”275  
 
The research team learnt that the problem of working together effectively to 
achieve results was multifaceted and defied attempts to produce simple cookbook of 
key steps.276 Rather, the real successes often came through ad hoc responses after 
an “a ha” moment of realisation that existing responses were inadequate.277 A “public 
entrepreneur” was often pivotal in this. These individuals are willing to step outside of 
the existing constraints and use their horizontal and vertical networks to achieve 
results.278 They were aided by senior figures, the so-called “guardian angels”, who 
recognised and supported the ability of these entrepreneurs. The final part in this was 
the “fellow travellers”, who were like-minded people that saw themselves working as 
part of the network on a common problem.279 
  
In outlining these factors, the project observed that current ‘joined-up working’ 
overwhelmingly relied on “creative and energetic” individuals rather than 
institutionalised frameworks. They found that the public entrepreneurs did not see 
themselves as having the solutions, but identified issues that no single agency could 
solve and built an interagency network to develop new perspectives and approaches 
to addressing them.280 These individuals’ personalities, leadership style, and record 
of accomplishment, provided the essential building blocks to set up an interagency 
process.281 However, the project also discovered that:282 
 
In practice, there is only limited organisational support for this approach, although 
there is a lot said about collaboration, joined-up government, and inter-sectoral 
working. What is lacking is a system-wide understanding of what is involved, when 
it might be worth the effort, and how it should be initiated and supported. 
 
The research found that these entrepreneurs were reliant on their guardian angels, 
but such individuals were not always forthcoming: 
 
                                               
275 Ibid. 
276 Derek Gill Elizabeth Eppel, Miriam Lips, Bill Ryan Better Connected Services for Kiwis: Discussion 
Document for Managers and Front-Line Staff on Better Joining up the Horizontal and the Vertical 
(Institute of Policy Studies, School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington 2008)  available at 
http://ips.ac.nz/events/completed-activities/joiningup/Connected%20Services%20ver%2010.pdf. 
277 Ibid.   6. 
278 Ibid. 
279 Ibid. 
280 Ibid.   24. 
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Frustration and discouragement were traced back to ‘risk-averse organisations and 
managers’, senior managers who are ‘busy managing upwards and not for 
outcomes’, the dangers of ‘putting your head above the parapet’, the ‘culture of 
busy-ness’, and so on. A ‘lack of leadership’, a ‘lack of permission’ and a ‘lack of 
reward’ were also identified. 
 
Therefore, many of the significant problems with increased collaboration were judged 
not to do with structures or budgetary silos, but were often the ‘soft issues’. These 
were issues such as organisational cultures, values and routines, professional 
beliefs, as well as institutional values and preferences.283 These findings were 
reinforced by Australian policy analysis in 2007:284 
 
In the past, the outcomes we are now looking to achieve from whole of government 
activity were mostly pursued through organisational restructuring and machinery of 
government changes. What is new is that today’s whole of government approaches 
tend to look primarily to the development of organisational cultures, capabilities and 
relationships that support, model, understand and aspire to whole of government 
solutions. 
 
 The value of the IPS research is that it clearly identifies the challenges 
involved with whole of government working at the service delivery level. Add to this 
the growing literature on the requirement for culture change throughout the levels of 
government, there is an opportunity to outline a set of factors and conditions for a 
more effective whole-of-government approach. 
 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
 
 In 2000, Brewer and Seldon wrote, “Organizational performance is a socially 
constructed phenomenon that is subjective, complex, and particularly hard to 
measure in the public sector”.285 Measurement is made somewhat more difficult 
when approaching complex social issues that require multiple-agency responses 
over extended timeframes. This is no different to the measurement of management 
of the contemporary complex peace support operations.  Brewer and Seldon state, 
quite accurately, that:286 
 
                                               
283 Bill Ryan, 'Managing for Joint Outcomes: Connecting up the Horizontal and the Vertical.' 
284 Briggs, "A Passion for Policy," 9. 
285 Gene A. Brewer and Sally Coleman Selden, 'Why Elephants Gallop: Assessing and Predicting 
Organizational Performance in Federal Agencies,' Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory 10, no. 4 (2000): 688. 
286 Ibid. 
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Previous research has tended to focus on narrow, efficiency-related measures of 
performance … Such narrow measures of performance can produce misleading 
conclusions about organizational effectiveness. Finally, researchers typically impose 
their own definitions of organizational effectiveness. Yet they should not impose an 
arbitrary set of indicators; rather, they should ask "effectiveness from whose 
perspective"? 
 
 
The 2001 Review of the Centre and subsequent 2004 legislation set the 
scene and provided the direction for public management into the 21st century. These 
changes were clearly aimed at the structural weaknesses in the NPM reforms. The 
legislation was critical in shaping the government’s agenda in addressing the 
increasingly complex ‘wicked problems’. The changes were directed at enhancing the 
potential of the public sector to respond to these challenges by increased integration, 
collaboration and institutional culture changes towards a whole of government 
approach. 
 
What does appear to have been lacking, if the IPS research is accurate, is a 
concentration on how to implement these changes more effectively at the service 
delivery level. While there are formal whole of government procedures at the senior 
levels (Cabinet, the DESC system, and inter-departmental committees for example), 
the front-line staff and managers lack institutional assistance and tangible incentives 
to join-up. Again, this is the same in external operations; the Domestic and External 
Security Coordination system is arguably an efficient whole-of-government tool for 
policy development – where there is a requirement for extensive investigation is how 
well agencies and individuals join-up at the service delivery level. 
 
The various legislative changes made by the National Government indicate 
an intention to strengthen service delivery by a rhetorical concentration on the ‘font 
lines’. Ministers have turned the terms ‘efficiency’ and ‘front line’ into mantras as they 
have justified job losses and restructuring within the wider public sector. The whole-
of-government approach is being used as a tool to drive efficiency – much as the 
previous Labour government sold the whole-of-government approach as a tool to 
resolve complex issues. What is less certain is whether the current government will 
be more successful at identifying the correct methods or management instruments to 
achieve their aims.  
 
The literature indicates that key obstacles to effective and efficient whole-of-
government approach are the ‘soft’ issues – such as the organisational cultures, 
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values, and routines. As public organisations have evolved, they have gradually 
adapted to internal and external pressure. In a process of institutionalisation, they 
have developed individual cultural features reflected by their informal norms and 
values.287 To attempt to encourage a rapid transformation of those norms and values 
will be difficult. To add to the difficulty, there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach to 
resolve this problem.  
 
Research has indicated that organisational culture significantly affects the 
performance of public organisations.288 Meyers et al have outlined that the use of 
management instruments will be more effective in organisations with a goal oriented 
or customer oriented culture, than in organisations where such a culture is less 
dominant.289 This is very salient, for example, when looking at a WGA to peace 
support operations where the institutional culture of discipline forces is starkly 
different from that of civilian agencies.  
 
This research contends that in order to achieve an effective whole-of-
government approach institutional cultures of differing agencies need not assimilate 
but should instead be complementary.290 To do so, agencies need to understand the 
culture of the agencies they are working with – what is their raison d’être, what is 
their structure, how do they operate, what is their capability and capacity. Individuals 
within those agencies must understand how they can be of value to the partner 
organisation in order to leverage the most value from the collaboration. This requires 
a distinct change in mindset towards a culture of openness and information sharing. 
 
One possible management instrument that may expedite the process, 
especially so that it permeates through to the front lines, is to ensure that evaluation 
of officials at all levels takes into account their ability to ‘join-up’ where required. In 
theoretical terms, this is referred to as principal agent theory. A branch of economic 
organisational theory, it advocates the use of result based management incentives 
and tools to increase agencies’ performance.291 
                                               
287 Selznick, Leadership in Administration, cited in, Lægreid, "Democracy and Administrative Policy: 
Contrasting Elements of NPM and Post-NPM". 
288 See: Koen Verhoest Falke Meyers, Eva Beuselinck, "Performance of Public Sector Organizations: 
Do Management Instruments Matter?" (paper presented at the A performing public sector: the second 
transatlantic dialogue”, Leuven, België, 1-3 June 2006) available at 
http://soc.kuleuven.be/io/performance/paper/WS5/WS5_Meyers_Verhoest_Beuselinck.pdf (accessed 02 
January 2011), Brewer and Selden, 'Why Elephants Gallop: Assessing and Predicting Organizational 
Performance in Federal Agencies.' 
289 Falke Meyers, "Performance of Public Sector Organizations: Do Management Instruments Matter?". 
290 See: Andrea Barbara Baumann, 'Clash of Organisational Cultures? The Challenge of Integrating 
Civilian and Military Efforts in Stabilisation Operations,' RUSI 153, no. 6 (2008). 
291 See for detailed analysis: Falke Meyers, "Performance of Public Sector Organizations: Do 
Management Instruments Matter?". 
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Typically, government employees are assessed by use of an annual (or bi-
annual) performance appraisal. This is what drives their remuneration and career 
progress. If joint-working and whole-of-government requirements are not explicitly 
articulated in these appraisals, there is no direct value to the individual employee to 
meet what is arguably a Government priority. Put simply, individual annual 
performance appraisals require clearly articulated goals and measurements for their 
cross-departmental activities so officials are rewarded and recognised for joint 
working. The IPS research found that certain individuals – the ‘public entrepreneurs’ 
were able to identify where they could gain value from networking in order to ‘get the 
job done’. However, by providing real incentives to join-up it is more likely that a 
greater number of officials will look to see where they can gain value from doing so. 
While this research does not contend that that is a simple instrument to design and 
implement, it has the ability to shape thinking towards a whole of government 
approach. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter 5: New Zealand’s Whole-of-Government 
Approach to Peace Support Operations 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to critically review the whole-of-government approach to 
New Zealand’s peace support operations. It will examine how and why the approach 
was incorporated into these operations. It will then turn to an examination of the 
impact of the approach. To do this, the roles of the key departments tasked with New 
Zealand’s offshore operations will be analysed. Within this there will be specific focus 
on how the whole-of-government approach has affected the drive for increased 
efficiency and effectiveness. This chapter will build on the argument posted in the 
previous chapters that a critical factor required for efficient and effective whole-of-
government working is culture change. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Overview 
 
  Into the late 1990s, New Zealand’s focus on external security began to shift 
towards the growing instability in the Pacific. By the time of the September 11 attacks 
in the United States, Australian and New Zealand analysts were alive to the potential 
links between poverty, conflict, and insecurity.292 Those attacks provided a blunt 
education to those who were not cognisant of the risk of leaving weak and failing 
states to flounder. The international assistance subsequently provided by New 
Zealand in the following years was to a large degree motivated by the need to 
prevent insecurity spilling across international borders and impacting global, regional 
or national security. During that period, New Zealand has undergone a significant 
evolution in the nature and management of its assistance to these so-called 
‘complex’ operations.  
 
                                               
292 Brown Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts?: Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile 
States   77. 
The research questions that guided this section are: 
 
• What is the background of the WGA in NZ’s PSOs? 
• How has the concept been implemented in NZ’s PSO’s? 
• What are the weaknesses or barriers? 
• What is required to add value? 
Callum Martin 
66 
 
Since 2001, New Zealand has been involved in complex peace support 
operations in Timor-Leste, Afghanistan and Solomon Islands. They are termed 
complex due to the understanding that the assistance required is not merely the 
traditional notion of security – most often on the form of military assistance. The 
assistance required runs across all pillars of civil society – economic, law and justice, 
governance and public administration. As was earlier cited in this thesis, the OECD 
Fragile States Group argued that successful development in fragile environments 
strongly relied on “well-sequenced and coherent progress across the political, 
security, economic and administrative domains”.293 The outcome of that argument is 
that failure of one of these pillars risks failure of the others. The interdependence of 
these domains is analogous to the interdependence of the domains that are required 
to address the domestic ‘wicked problems’. It is not surprising then that officials 
working towards effective and efficient management of foreign operations have 
picked up the same tools that have been used to approach management of 
entrenched domestic issues. 
 
This has been the experience of New Zealand. As these operations have 
progressed, a growing number of New Zealand departments and agencies began 
taking on international responsibilities in addition to their domestic portfolios. The 
question that follows from this is how the whole-of-government approach is being 
used to coordinate the growing number of agencies involved in today’s complex 
security environment? 
 
 
5.3 Whole-of-Government Approach to External Security 
 
 There are a number of government agencies responsible for New Zealand’s 
external security. The following provides an account of the development of the whole-
of-government approach in security policy and practice in New Zealand. It illustrates 
the Domestic and External Security Coordination (DESC) structure that is used for 
coordinating the efforts of security-related agencies. The DESC system mandates 
responsibility for external security at four levels: 
 
• The Cabinet Committee on Domestic and External Security Co-ordination 
(DES) and External Relations and Defence Committee (ERD) 
 
                                               
293 OECD Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States   13. 
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• The Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Co-ordination 
(ODESC);  
 
• The Security Risk Group (DPMC), and; 
 
• The individual agencies involved in national security. 
 
 
5.3.1 Cabinet and Cabinet Committees 
 
 New Zealand’s has a unicameral Westminster style of government. The 
Cabinet, which is chaired by the Prime Minister, makes high-level policy decisions 
and sets direction. Often, Cabinet delegates power to act on specific areas to the 
relevant Cabinet Committees. Decisions made by those Committees must be tabled 
at the next Cabinet meeting – and all Ministers are bound under the convention of 
collective responsibility to publicly support all decisions. Structurally, this is an 
effective and efficient whole-of-government system at the senior strategy level of 
government. In effect, this system, which has been operating for decades, is an 
example of where ‘whole-of-government’ has been operating.  
 
 When an issue arises where the United Nations or a host Government may 
request New Zealand to assist in a complex peace support operation, Cabinet and its 
Cabinet Committees, is the executive decision-making body.  
   
 
Domestic and External Security Co-ordination (DES) 
 
The Cabinet Committee on Domestic and External Security Co-ordination 
(DES) is the central decision-making body of executive government for issues 
involving intelligence, security, and crisis management.294 The Prime Minister chairs 
the committee, and its members are drawn from those Ministers with portfolio 
responsibilities for key agencies involved in national security or depending on the 
needs of any specific crisis. The Committee’s Terms of Reference are:295 
 
                                               
294 Managing Threats to Domestic Security  (Report of the Controller and Auditor-General, 2003)  
available at http://www.oag.govt.nz/2003/domestic-security/docs/domestic-security.pdf (accessed 10 
January 2011) 31. 
295 DPMC Cabinet Committees ~ Cabinet Committee on Domestic and External Security Co-Ordination 
(DES), Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, available at 
http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet/committees/des.html, (accessed 11 January 2011). 
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To co-ordinate and direct the national response to a major crisis or to circumstances 
affecting national security (such as a natural disaster, biosecurity problem, health 
emergency, or terrorist/military threat) within New Zealand or involving New Zealand's 
interests overseas; 
 
To consider issues of oversight, organisation and priorities for the New Zealand 
intelligence community and any issues which, because of their security or intelligence 
implications, the Prime Minister directs be considered by the committee; 
 
To consider policy and other matters relating to domestic and external security co-
ordination. 
 
This committee has power to act where there is a need for urgent action and/or 
operational or security considerations demand it.   
 
External Relations and Defence Committee (ERD) 
 
The External Relations and Defence Committee meet every second week to 
consider policy and other matters relating to foreign affairs, international trade, 
development assistance, and defence.296 The Committee comprises Ministers form 
Defence, Disarmament and Arms Control, Foreign Affairs, Police and Trade. The 
Committee maintains authority over ongoing issues relating to external security. 
 
Decisions of the committees under power to act are reported to the next 
Cabinet meeting as appropriate.297 Again, structurally, this system provides for an 
efficient whole-of-government repose to an urgent issue at the senior level of 
government. 
 
 
5.3.2 ODESC 
 
Under the Cabinet Committees sits the Officials Committee for Domestic and 
External Security Coordination (ODESC). As outlined by the Auditor General, this 
Committee facilitates a whole-of-government approach to national crises and issues 
affecting security, such as New Zealand’s peace support operations.298 ODESC is a 
chief executive level forum in which agencies come together to establish whole-of-
                                               
296 DPMC Cabinet Committees ~ Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee (ERD), 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, available at 
http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet/committees/erd.html, (accessed 11 January 2011). 
297 DPMC Cabinet Committees ~ Cabinet Committee on Domestic and External Security Co-Ordination 
(DES),  
298 Managing Threats to Domestic Security    31. 
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government approaches to national security. It provides strategic policy advice to the 
Prime Minister and exercises policy oversight in the areas of intelligence and 
security, terrorism, maritime security and emergency preparedness.299 It comprises a 
generic committee with flexible membership, which mainly deals with response and 
recovery issues for specific events or issues. ODESC has two standing committees – 
ODESC(P) for continuing policy, planning and preparedness, and ODESC(I) for 
intelligence matters.  
 
Membership of ODESC comprises Chief Executives from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Defence Force, Ministry of Defence, NZ Security 
Intelligence Service, Government Communications Security Bureau, NZ Police, 
Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management, Treasury and others as and 
when necessary. The Chief Executive of DPMC chairs the group.300  
 
 
5.3.3 The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
 
The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) is one of the central 
agencies responsible for coordinating and managing public sector performance.301 It 
serves the Executive (the Prime Minister, the Governor-General, and Cabinet) 
through the development of impartial advice and support services that assist 
government decision-making at both strategic and operational levels.302 DPMC 
comprises apolitical officials who do not change with a change in the administration. 
The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Palmer has argued that:303 
 
The injection of these elements of political management into the relationship between 
ministers and the public service has added another layer of checks in the system of 
inputs to decision making that must be taken into account . The result has been to add 
complexity to the process and to increase the time taken to make decisions, but it also 
means there is less chance of unintended political consequences flowing from the 
decisions when they are taken. 
 
 
                                               
299 Security & Risk Group,  Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, available at 
http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/dess/index.htm, (accessed 09 January). 
300 Ibid.  
301 DPMC About DPMC, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, available at 
http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/dpmc/index.htm, (accessed 09 January). 
302 NZDF Statement of Intent for the Period 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2009 (New Zealand Defence Force, 
2006)  available at http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/public-docs/nzdfsoi2006.pdf (accessed 08 
January 2011). 
303 Geoffrey Palmer, 'The Cabinet, the Prime Minister and the Constitution: The Constitutional 
Background to Cabinet,' New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 4, no. 1 (2006): 14. 
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Within DPMC, the key security related body is the Security and Risk Group 
(SRG).304 The SRG is responsible for national security threats that affect New 
Zealand and its interests, both domestic and foreign. SRG coordinates the activities 
of central government agencies in preparing for and responding to security crises, 
emergencies and natural disasters. The SRG provides leadership and coordinates 
central government activities aimed at protecting New Zealand’s domestic and 
external security, including intelligence, counter-terrorism preparedness, 
emergency/crisis management and defence operations.305 It oversees agencies that 
have operational responsibilities for managing security risks, and has a central role in 
overseeing the preparation of overarching national security strategies. 
 
The SRG provides advice and support to ODESC and convenes inter-
departmental watch groups to monitor major issues and to provide oversight for 
interagency action. In the event of a crisis or emergency affects New Zealand's 
interests, a watch group is formed of senior officials from relevant departments to 
monitor and advise the government on the situation. The SRG monitors the 
development of overarching national strategies and provides leadership in creating 
policy and coordinating the interagency response to actual events. The SRG 
coordinated the whole of government approach to respond to events such as the Fiji 
coups, the September 11 attacks, the Timor-Leste crisis and the possibility of conflict 
between India and Pakistan.306 
 
 In 2010 the Chief Executive of DPMC, Maarten Wevers, indicated that two of 
DPMC’s business units, the National Assessments Bureau and the SRG would be 
moving premises. They would be collocating with staff from the GCSB to “improve 
the performance of and coordinate the government’s security and intelligence 
agencies.”307 It was stressed that the move would be one of a number of steps being 
taken, including “working more closely together and better aligning the activities of a 
number of agencies, which have external, and domestic security responsibilities.”308 
Another of these steps has been the SRG taking the lead on the development of a 
national security framework.309 The 2010 DPMC Statement of Intent detailed that the 
                                               
304 The Security and Risk Group, formally the Domestic and External Security Group, was renamed in 
2010. 
305 NZDF Statement of Intent for the Period 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 (New Zealand Defence Force, 
2007)  available at http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/public-docs/2007/NZDF-SOI-07-08.pdf 
(accessed 09 January 2011). 
306 Security & Risk Group,   
307 DPMC Statement of Intent 2010-2014 (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2010)  
available at http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/dpmc/publications/soi-dpmc-2010-14.pdf (accessed 10 January 
2011) 5. 
308 Ibid. 
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work will delineate the “foundations and organisational arrangements for managing 
national security issues, and will support the process of determining which security 
issues are of national significance.”310This is a clear indication of government priority 
to better synthesise the collective roles of the departments tasked with the 
maintenance of New Zealand’s security sector. It very neatly reflects the argument 
cited by Christensen and Lægreid in Chapter Two, of the “importance of 
governments’ avoiding contradictory outcomes and ensuring that information is 
shared between agencies.”311 
 
 DPMC and especially SRG form a vital link in efficient and effective whole-of-
government approach to national security at the policy and programme development 
level. The SRG is central in this endeavour; it coordinates policy advice and provides 
oversight for the variety of departments engaged in national security. It is located 
within walking distance of all these departments in Wellington – which promotes 
effective and efficient socialisation of relevant individuals. The following figure 
provides an overview of New Zealand’s security and intelligence structural 
framework. 
 
 Below the senior strategy levels of New Zealand governance are the 
individual departments – of the bottom three levels public management.312 These 
departments merge the bureaucratic, (policy and programme development), 
organisational (programme management) and the local (service delivery) levels. 
Within a whole-of-government approach, each of these levels are required to work 
horizontally across departments – rather than solely within their vertical hierarchy. 
Traditionally, it has been the military who has taken the lead in New Zealand’s 
external security. Traditionally, it could be argued that within the disciplined 
hierarchical structure of a military, working horizontally is an anathema. However, it 
was the New Zealand Defence Force who was the first to outwardly promote joined-
up approaches to peace support operations. 
                                               
310 Ibid. 
311 See Chapter 2.2, page 11: Lægreid The Whole-of-Government Approach - Regulation, Performance, 
and Public-Sector Reform. 
312 See for a detailed breakdown of levels of public governance, Hyde, 'How to Make the Rhetoric of 
Joined-up Government Really Work.' 
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Figure 3: An Overview of New Zealand's Security and Intelligence Arrangements313 
 
5.3.4 New Zealand Defence Force 
 
The first public indication that a whole-of-government approach was entering 
the discourse of foreign and security policy came in November 2000. The New 
Zealand Defence Force Capability Review conducted at that time declared that:314 
 
Defence is one aspect of New Zealand's foreign and security policy (see DPF) New 
Zealand can best contribute to regional security and global peace by promoting a 
comprehensive security approach which utilises policies and resources based on a 
“whole of government” approach. 
 
The Defence Policy Framework (DPF) referred to above had been published the 
previous June (2000). It had stated that:315 
 
                                               
313 Adapted and updated from the original: Securing Our Nation's Safety: How New Zealand Manages 
Its Security and Intelligence Agencies,  Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, available at 
http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/dpmc/publications/securingoursafety/overview.html, (accessed 11 January). 
314 New Zealand Defence Force Capability Reviews Phase One – Land Forces and Sealift (The New 
Zealand Ministry of Defence 2000)  available at http://www.defence.govt.nz/reports-publications/nzdf-
cap-rev/introduction.html. 
315 The Government's Defence Policy Framework (The New Zealand Government, 2000)  available at 
http://www.defence.govt.nz/reports-publications/defence-policy-framework/defpol-frmwrk.html (accessed 
04 January 2011) 1. 
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Defence policy and foreign policy are a partnership aimed at securing New Zealand’s 
physical, economic, social and cultural well being, and meeting our regional and global 
responsibilities. 
 
This demonstrated an understanding and desire for the traditionally foreign focused 
elements of New Zealand government to work in partnership. It is evident that it was 
an evolving concept at that time and demonstrated that the NZDF was trying to settle 
on the definition between a ‘whole-of-government’ and the ‘comprehensive 
approach’. What these statements did not articulate was the requirement to 
incorporate the non-security focused elements of the government apparatus in order 
to achieve government security outcomes.  
 
By 2006 the NZDF had refined its definition of the whole-of-government 
approach. Building on the definition provided in the 2004 Australian Connecting 
Government Report,316 the following succinctly expresses the clear objectives of the 
notion as well as its justification:317 
 
Whole of Government denotes government departments and public service agencies 
working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal (or outcome) and an 
integrated government response to particular issues or situations. Whole of 
Government expects the State sector to work like a single, integrated organisation, 
rather than a collection of seemingly independent service providers. Whole of 
Government approaches work on the assumption that responses (to problems) will be 
more effective if we combine the efforts of all relevant agencies into a single 
coordinated strategy. 
 
While borrowed from the Australian’s, it was useful as it was the first clearly 
articulated definition of the whole-of-government approach in the New Zealand 
security sector. 
 
The concept was mentioned in NZDF public documentation over the next 
several years without much fanfare.318 However, as the government moved towards 
managing for outcomes rather than outputs the use of whole-of-government 
language markedly increased. This was reflected in the 2005 NZDF Statement of 
                                               
316 Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia’s Priority Challenges    2. 
317 NZDF Statement of Intent for the Period 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2009. 
318 The 2003 Annual Report outlined with regard to the new military capabilities, “These capabilities are 
being developed in the context of a whole-of-government approach to security. They will provide options 
to respond to a range of future security challenges including both conventional threats and emerging 
challenges such as trans-national threats.” See also: 
  NZDF Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine (NZDDP-D) (First Edition, New Zealand Defence 
Force, 2004)  available at http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/public-docs/nzddp_2004_web.pdf 
(accessed 08 January 2011) 6-5, 8.31. 
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Intent (SOI) where there was a more focused move to asserting the relationship 
between NZDF and the common and shared outcomes of other public agencies. The 
SOI signalled, “The relationship that the NZDF has with these other departments and 
agencies, under the Whole-of-Government approach, is taking on increased 
importance.”319 It was the first public document that outlined in a structured way the 
summary of relationships between NZDF and other agencies. This is a clear 
indication that NZDF had begun to demonstrate and justify outcomes based on its 
coordination and collaboration with other departments.  
 
 In the 2006 SOI, the NZDF raised the issue of how it would evaluate whole of 
government outcomes as set by government. It was stressed that the Operational 
Preparedness Reporting System (OPRES) used to  measure the preparedness of the 
force elements of the NZDF to undertake operations was not suitable for measuring 
whole of government outcomes.320 The SOI argued that the achievement of Defence 
Outcomes under the approach was often reliant on the contributions from many 
public departments that had an interest in wider security issues. The NZDF believed 
that to adequately measure wider security outcomes, higher-level indicators and 
impact measures were required to encompass input from all relevant sources:321  
 
The MoD, DPMC,MFAT, NZ Police, NZ Customs Service, Immigration Service of the 
Department of Labour, and other departments and agencies involved in the greater 
“security of New Zealand and its people”, and actual decision-making by the Cabinet, 
all have a significant part to play in determining the coordinated and aggregated 
indicators and impact measures at this (higher) level.  
 
It will be some time before a robust, truly Whole-of-Government approach on this can 
be achieved. In the meantime the NZDF will continue to identify the indicators and 
impact measures that are applicable to Defence contributions to national security – in 
its widest sense.  
 
This illustrates that NZDF was cognisant of and wanted to outline that they could not 
be solely responsible for setting or accounting for New Zealand’s security outcomes. 
It was also interesting to note NZDF’s admission that New Zealand did not currently 
have a “robust, truly Whole-of-Government approach on this” and that it would take 
some time to achieve it. 
 
                                               
319 NZDF Statement of Intent for the Period 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2008 (New Zealand Defence Force, 
2005)  available at http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/public-docs/nzdfsoi2005.pdf (accessed 08 
January 2011) 36. 
320 NZDF Statement of Intent for the Period 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2009   23. 
321 Ibid. 
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What NZDF believed was required was a clear set of indicators and impact 
measures to be developed that could proved effective and efficient accountability of 
whole of government working. The development of such indicators appears to have 
begun in 2009. The above paragraphs, which had been repeated in the 2007 and 
2008 SOIs were altered in 2009 where the second paragraph read:322 
 
While it will be some time before a robust, truly Whole of Government approach on this 
can be achieved, the Ministry of Defence, in conjunction with the NZDF, is promoting 
moves in this direction and a project on this, sponsored by the MoD, is progressing.  
 
That project, which was being performed on behalf of the Domestic and External 
Security Committee (DESC), was designed to develop a set of measurable New 
Zealand Security Sector Outcomes.323 The project was put on hold pending 
completion of the 2010 Defence Review/Defence White Paper although the 2010 SOI 
highlighted that the project would re-commence and draw on the work of the Defence 
Review. It was noted that:324 
 
 the intent is that all departments/agencies of government that contribute to the security 
of New Zealand will be able to show, in measurable terms, how they contribute to the 
developed set of security outcomes. 
 
The development of a collective set of outcomes and indicators is a vital step. Joint 
inter-departmental targets to which each relevant department can contribute will 
reinforce commitment to policy coherence, while an integrated results framework 
would enable an effective monitoring progress and assess impact.325  
 
 The NZDF was early to recognise the importance of using a whole-of-
government approach in reaching their outcomes. They continually promoted the 
approach in public documentation throughout the decade and by 2009 had begun 
work with the Ministry of Defence in designing a set of government security 
outcomes.  
 
                                               
322 NZDF Statement of Intent 2009 - 2012 (New Zealand Defence Force, 2009)  available at 
http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/public-docs/2009/soi/nzdf-soi-2009-12.pdf (accessed 22 March 
2011) 44. 
323 NZDF Statement of Intent 2010 - 2013 (G55 SOI (2010), New Zealand Defence Force, 2010)  
available at http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/public-documents/soi/default.htm (accessed 08 January 2011). 
324 Ibid. 
325 See for similar findings with regard to New Zealand’s whole-of-government approach to 
development: OECD New Zealand (2010) Dac Peer Review: Main Findings and Recommendations 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010)  available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/54/0,3746,en_21571361_44315115_46730038_1_1_1_1,00.html 
(accessed 09 January 2011). 
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The official literature shows that the approach began to take a larger role on 
the strategic thinking of NZDF around 2006. It was around the same time that it also 
took hold within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Once MFAT had fully 
embraced the concept, they quickly took ownership of it and took the external lead. 
 
 
5.3.5 The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
 
The whole-of-government approach began to be mentioned in official MFAT 
documentation from the early 2000s, although it became more prominent from 2004.  
In the only mention of the concept in the 2003 Annual Review, MFAT described that 
it was “deeply involved” in the development of New Zealand Trade and Enterprise.  A 
key interest in this process, they outlined, “was ensuring that the basis was laid for 
effective whole-of-government approaches in New Zealand’s offshore 
representation.”326 The 2004 Annual Report took account of global security issues, 
stating that, “The Government appointed its first Ambassador for Counter-Terrorism 
to coordinate and focus a whole-of-government approach to the international 
campaign against terrorism.”327  
 
The 2004 Statement of Intent observed that the new “managing for outcomes” 
environment for state sector planning reflected the Government’s requirement for 
broader, more strategic management and the priority it attaches to a whole-of-
government effort.328 The SOI outlined that Government outcomes for MFAT were 
set across the security field, in support of economic growth and innovation, to 
strengthen the international system, to contribute to poverty elimination and to protect 
New Zealanders abroad.329 It is evident that MFAT recognised that it would be 
required to work across agencies to achieve wide sweeping outcomes.  Like NZDF, 
MFAT highlighted a necessity for efficient coordination between departments and 
agencies.  
 
                                               
326 MFAT Annual Report 2002-2003 (The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2003)  
available at http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Media-and-publications/Publications/Annual-report/index.php 
(accessed 08 January 2011) 70.  
327 MFAT Annual Report 2003-2004 (The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004)  
available at http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Media-and-publications/Publications/Annual-report/index.php 
(accessed 08 January 2011) 5. 
328 MFAT Statement of Intent 2004-2005 (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004)  
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 The 2004 SOI provided a description of one of the key pillars in this enhanced 
coordination of government agencies working abroad. The External Relations and 
Defence network, which the Chief Executive of MFAT chaired, was comprised of over 
30 agencies involved in managing and implementing the Government’s external 
policies.330 The Chief Executives of those departments and agencies meet every six 
months to ensure there is effective inter-agency information flow and coherent policy 
development on work with an external dimension.331 The Network comprises 
numerous inter-agency sub-groups on specific issues, ranging from cooperation with 
the New Zealand Defence Force in peace support operations, to joint activities with 
New Zealand Trade and Enterprise to advance the internationalisation of 
New Zealand business.332 
 
The SOI stated that in December 2003 the ERD Chief Executives “restated 
their commitment to cooperate, consult, collaborate and coordinate with the aim of 
delivering a more cohesive effort in international activities.”333 This came at a time 
when a growing number of government agencies had begun establishing an offshore 
presence. In order to maximise the impact of this combined presence, MFAT took 
ownership of supporting and coordinating these interrelated commitments. The 
following year’s SOI (2005) was the first to put this coordination into its current 
moniker – “NZ Inc”.334 The new term covered the full spectrum of New Zealand’s 
offshore commitments – from immigration to police liaison posts.  Peace support 
operations were a sub-section of this larger grouping, though would take on 
increasing importance as the contributions to these operations became more civilian 
focused. 
   
                                               
330 Departments and agencies represented in the ERD network are Agriculture and Forestry and its 
Food Safety Authority, Conservation, Culture and Heritage, Customs, Defence, the Defence Force, 
Economic Development, Education, Environment, Fisheries, Foreign Affairs and Trade, Immigration 
Service, Inland Revenue, Internal Affairs, Labour, National Library, Pacific Island Affairs, Police, Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, Research Science and Technology, New Zealand Security Intelligence Service 
(NZSIS), Te Puni Kokiri, Tourism, Trade and Enterprise, Transport and the Treasury: Ibid. 
331 Ibid. 
332 MFAT Post-Election Brief 2008 (NZ Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, 2008 )  available at 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/media-and-publications/peb-nov2008.pdf (accessed 22 March 2011) 
4. 
333 MFAT Statement of Intent 2004-2005   54. 
334 MFAT Statement of Intent 2005-2008 (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2005)  
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By 2006 Cabinet had identified the trend of increasing offshore engagements 
by New Zealand agencies and were keen to maximise efficiency and effectiveness. 
MFAT defined this increased commitment in the 2006/7 Annual Review:335 
 
As international developments and cross-border issues continue to impact on domestic 
policy, more government agencies are deploying staff offshore. Staff from other 
government agencies now comprise one-third of all New Zealand-based staff at our 
overseas posts. One way in which New Zealand can multiply the reach and impact of 
its external engagement is through increased policy cohesion and cooperation among 
the agencies working offshore. 
 
To increase New Zealand’s effectiveness and efficiency, Cabinet directed that 
guidelines be prepared to “ensure agencies do not work in separate silo operations, 
but have mechanisms in place for identifying opportunities and responding with 
whole-of-government approaches and initiatives when this is in New Zealand’s best 
interest.”336 The 2007 Annual Review indicated that this request had been addressed 
by detailing the development of the formal Framework for NZ Inc Operations 
Offshore Charter. Supported by the ERD Network and endorsed by Government in 
May 2007, the framework consisted of a “shared outcome, values, set of relationship 
principles, and suggested practices for building more coherent and coordinated 
operations and strategic alignment among government agencies operating 
overseas.”337 MFAT held that its precepts were largely common sense and had 
already been implemented at many posts where there were multi-agency interests in 
the bilateral relationship concerned.338 NZDF referred to the document in several 
publications, stating:339 
 
The mid-2008 issued “Framework for NZ Inc Operations Offshore Charter” re-
emphasise the benefits of maximising opportunities and minimising risks for New 
Zealand through whole of government approaches for advancing national interests and 
national identity offshore. NZDF Defence Attachés and Advisers are aware of this and 
will work closely with their respective Heads of New Zealand Missions to advance this 
approach. 
 
The Charter provided that the head of a New Zealand mission in a country would be 
the senior New Zealand Government official responsible for ensuring NZ Inc 
                                               
335 MFAT Annual Report for the Year Ended 30 June 2007 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2007)  
available at http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/media-and-publications/annual-
report/annualreport0607.pdf (accessed 22 March 2011) 6. 
336 Ibid.   20. 
337 Ibid. 
338 Ibid. 
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operates in a coherent and aligned way in that location.340 While this was a valuable 
development, the focus was not specifically on peace support operations although it 
would come to play an increasingly important role.  
 
The 2006/7 Annual Review provided an indication of the development of the 
approach and MFAT’s increased role in peace support operations. The Overview at 
the beginning of the Review stated that:341 
 
Increasingly, responses to complex security situations have required the Ministry to 
work closely with other agencies on whole-of-government responses to inter-agency 
deployments. New Zealand continued to manage deployments to the Solomon Islands, 
Timor-Leste, and Afghanistan in 2006/07. 
 
In the 2007/8 Annual Review, the importance was restated:342 
 
New Zealand continued to contribute significantly to international peace support 
operations. Currently about 400 New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) and 75 New 
Zealand Police personnel are deployed on 12 peace support missions in 14 countries. 
New Zealand’s largest missions are in Timor-Leste, Afghanistan, and the Solomon 
Islands.  
 
One way that MFAT has provided support and coordination for agencies involved in 
peace support operations in Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands is through weekly NZ 
Inc meetings chaired by the head of mission. All New Zealand agencies involved in 
the operation are invited to attend. This provides a very useful forum for sharing 
information and identifying synergies at the programme management level.  
 
With the change of Government on 2008 the New Zealand Foreign Affairs 
and Trade Post-Election Brief - November 2008 indicated again the importance of 
coordination in New Zealand’s peace support operations. The Brief illustrated that:343 
 
Engagement in support of fragile states requires a balance between security, political 
and development interventions, and a corresponding need for coordination between, 
and within, governments. New Zealand has implemented a whole-of-Government 
approach to engagement in the three complex integrated operations in the Solomon 
Islands, Timor-Leste and Afghanistan. 
 
                                               
340 Ibid. 
341 MFAT Annual Report for the Year Ended 30 June 2008 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2008)  
available at http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/media-and-publications/annual-report/ar-mfat-2007-
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MFAT outlined that they had developed a series of ‘sub-sectoral Pacific security 
strategies’ to inform the whole-of-government engagement in the Pacific by New 
Zealand agencies. This was a clear indication that these operations required a 
deeper and extended civilian component to compliment NZDF’s contributions – 
something that NZDF had been requesting since 2000.  
 
The following several years saw a distinct shift in the National-led 
government’s thinking towards more economic focus in management of MFAT. In 
response to the government’s strong desire to get better outcomes and efficiencies 
from New Zealand agencies working offshore, MFAT began work on developing 
processes to enhance NZ Inc coordination. This flowed into a major review led by the 
Ministries offshore network that was scheduled for 2009/10.  
 
 The official literature shows that MFAT began using whole-of-government 
rhetoric from early in the decade. The use of the concept drove the formulation of NZ 
Inc as a collective identify offshore as well as the Framework for the effective and 
efficient coordination of NZ Inc Operations Offshore. The External Relations and 
Defence Network, which is owned by MFAT, is a central component at the policy and 
programme development level. The sub-committees and inter-departmental teams 
that flow from the ERD further strengthen joined-up working. The Framework 
provides that New Zealand’s head of mission in a country is responsible for ensuring 
NZ Inc runs effectively and efficiently. What the public literature is silent on is how 
well the ‘front line’ staff are working together within NZ Inc. A question that arises is 
whether the same barriers – the soft issues – that pervade joined-up working in 
domestic public management are an issue within NZ Inc offshore. 
 
 
5.3.6 The Requirement for a Whole-of-Government National Security 
Statement 
 
 In 2003, the report on Managing Threats to Domestic Security found that the 
DESC structure provided an effective mechanism for establishing a whole-of-
government response to domestic security matters.344 While this was a positive 
outcome, the Report also found the system would substantially benefit from an 
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overarching strategic domestic security framework to guide the work of the many 
agencies involved; it argued that: 345 
 
A whole-of-government strategy for domestic security needs to be prepared to ensure 
that the efforts of the various agencies are being combined to achieve maximum effect. 
There is currently no such strategy, but DPMC is drawing up a national framework (or 
strategy) for domestic security. To be effective, this strategy will need to include a 
comprehensive description and assessment of the risks and threats facing New 
Zealand, and allocate to specific agencies the responsibility for countering these 
threats. 
 
The key elements of a strategic framework would include:346 
 
• a common understanding of what domestic security is; 
• clear goals and objectives (identified through the use of risk, threat, and vulnerability 
assessments) for the medium-to-long term; 
• clearly stated roles and responsibilities of various agencies and groups; 
• content and quality aspects in line with international best practice; and 
• periodic review to ensure that the framework continues to reflect the enduring risk 
environment. 
 
 
While the requirement for this overarching framework was identified, to this 
point it has not been achieved. Regardless, the findings of the 2003 Report are 
instructive for an analysis of the DESC system’s efficiency and effectiveness in 
external whole-of-government security responses. The DESC system provides a very 
high level of joined-up working at the Government and policy and program 
development levels. However, an overarching National Security Statement designed 
for both domestic and external security is required. The 2010 Defence Assessment 
emphasised this point:347 
 
New Zealand does not have a formal national security policy, and it is not the purpose of 
this Assessment to construct one. We do, however, suggest that a national policy 
framework would be desirable.  
 
 
                                               
345 Ibid.    35. 
346 Ibid. 
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As was outlined in the introduction to this chapter, from the turn of the century 
the NZDF was alive to the fact that as New Zealand’s external commitments have 
transformed, a growing number of New Zealand departments and agencies would be 
required to assist. The 2008 Doctrine Manual asserted that:348 
 
The NZDF recognises that in today’s complex security environment it is not the sole 
contributor to either the overall security of New Zealand or crises abroad. There are 
eleven other government agencies contributing to defence policy objectives or 
outcomes in New Zealand 
 
Of particular note in the above statement is the articulation of the NZDF’s raison 
d’être – the security of New Zealand.349 This is an obvious rationale for raising and 
maintaining armed forces. What is less clear is how the raison d’être for the 
traditionally domestically focused departments such as Police, Inland Revenue, 
Justice, Corrections, Immigration and Customs aligns with that of Defence (or 
Foreign Affairs and Trade). How does a department whose focus has been 
administration of taxes or the Courts in New Zealand integrate into a whole-of-
government operation offshore? A more nuanced question is why would they want 
to? On the face of it such operations do not advance their underlying objectives or 
targeted outcomes as provided by government. A National Security Statement that 
unambiguously outlines how those agencies contribute towards national security 
outcomes would therefore be constructive.  
 
Indeed, the 2010 Murdoch Review proposed that a methodology and 
process to better define and integrate the government’s national security 
goals would be addressed in 2010, though this has not been confirmed.350 
This would provide clarity and delineate lines of accountability for the 
growing number of agencies involved in external operations. This is 
particularly salient for New Zealand’s peace support operations where 
traditional security issues are often less relevant within the broader task of 
(re)constructing a functioning society. Agencies that have not been 
traditionally focused upon New Zealand’s security are required to become 
involved and need clear direction for their involvement, clarified 
description of roles, and robust reward and accountability frameworks. 
                                               
348 NZDF Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine (NZDDP-D) (Development Branch, 
Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force, 2008)  available at 
http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/public-docs/2008/nzddp-d-2008-ed-2.pdf  2-7. 
349 Article 2.4 of the Doctrine Manual outlines that the primary mission of the NZDF is to secure New 
Zealand against external threat, to protect our sovereign interests, including in the EEZ, and to be able 
to take action to meet likely contingencies in our strategic area of interest. 
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The 2010 Defence Assessment came to similar conclusions, 
recommending that an overarching national security policy for protecting 
New Zealand, our people, and our interests be developed which:351 
 
• reflects New Zealand’s core values; 
• responds to the major security challenges and drivers of instability; and 
• brings together the objectives of all ministries, agencies, and forces involved in 
protecting our national security. 
 
A key element of such a document will be a clear description of how the whole-of-
government approach is to be applied in offshore operations. It will require 
unambiguous collective national level outcomes where each agency must be 
collectively (but not equally) accountable.   
 
 
5.4 Complex Peace Support Operations  
  
In 2007, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Winston Peters outlined in a Speech to 
the Swedish Institution of International Affairs in Stockholm, that, “New Zealand is 
currently looking to improve its whole-of-government framework, with the aim of 
increasing the effectiveness of our engagement with fragile and post-conflict 
states.”352 In 2008, the incoming National-led Government quickly outlined its focus 
of value for money and efficiency in public policy. This was subsequently applied to 
the management of New Zealand’s external operations. Rather than drastically 
revising or implementing a new system, the existing whole-of-government approach 
was supported and strengthened.  
 
The whole-of-government approach to peace support operations has been 
evolving over the past decade. New Zealand continues to be involved in three 
complex peace support operations in Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands and Afghanistan. 
There is no ‘one size fits’ model when applying a whole-of-government approach to 
these operations. Though each of these operations has managed unique issues, they 
have all collectively informed and moulded the way that New Zealand conducts itself 
in these operations. 
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5.4.1 Timor-Leste 
 
New Zealand’s final contribution of the 1990s would set the tone for the coming 
decade. As East Timor moved towards independence, it became clear that the 
withdrawing pro-Indonesian militias were resorting to violence.353 New Zealand 
received popular domestic support to send troops to support the Timorese and 
prevent further atrocities. The New Zealand Defence Force was deployed under the 
auspices of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET). They remained in 
East Timor moving under the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor 
(UNTAET) in late 2000 and United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor 
(UNMISET) in May 2002. At its peak in October 1999, the NZDF had 1,100 
personnel in East Timor, which was New Zealand's largest overseas military 
deployment since the Korean War.354 However, it was not only NZDF that was 
involved; diplomatic staff were present and Police and were also called on to assist in 
the development of the nation.355 
 
While the mission in newly independent Timor-Leste had all the hallmarks of 
success, the reality was far from that. New Zealand withdrew the core of its troops 
from May 2005 after UNMISET had successfully completed its mandate. The United 
Nations Security Council then established the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste 
(UNOTIL).356 As part of UNOTIL NZDF provided Military Training Advisors to mentor 
Border Patrol Units and facilitate meetings between the Units and the Indonesian 
Army.357 However, as Dili degenerated into violence in spectacular fashion in April 
2006 there was a realisation that much of the work done in Timor had been 
superficial.358 The same issues of poor governance and corruption that plagued 
many of the South Pacific nations had clearly emerged in Timor-Leste.359 Australia 
and New Zealand were clear in their willingness for reengagement. The failure to 
build and support the core institutions in Timor-Leste reinforced the growing 
argument that more than just the security sector had to be focused on. Moreover, 
                                               
353 James Dunn Crimes against Humanity in East Timor, January to October 1999: Their Nature and 
Causes (2001)  available at http://www.etan.org/etanpdf/pdf1/dunn.pdf (accessed 22 March 2011). 
354 NZDF, "Ten Years in Timor," One Force, 3, October 2009, available at 
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similar to responses to domestic ‘wicked problems’, these operations could not be 
short term engagements – they required long term commitment of both resources 
and capital. They also required a deep analysis of how the operations were being 
constructed and managed. To coordinate New Zealand’s commitments across 
multiple agencies and extended periods, a whole-of-government approach was 
implemented and began to evolve.  
 
 
5.4.2 Afghanistan 
 
Similar complexity was found in New Zealand’s deployment to Bamian 
Province in Afghanistan that began in 2003. On June 9 the Government announced 
that it had reconnaissance teams in Afghanistan looking at the possibility of taking 
over a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). The Prime Minister stated:360 
 
It is now time to contribute to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The Afghan provisional 
government is working with a number of countries to establish security and rebuild 
society across Afghanistan. A significant part of this effort is through the deployment of 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams. … New Zealand intends to contribute to a PRT. If it 
proves to be within our capacities, that contribution will extend to leading a PRT. 
  
Since March 2005, NZ Police joined the deployment and were tasked to provide 
training to the Afghan National Police. New Zealand incrementally increased its 
official development assistance to Afghanistan from $9.5 million in 2009/2010 to $12-
14 million from 2010-2015, focused on improving agriculture, rural livelihoods, 
education and health.361 From the outset the mission was designed to incorporate a 
civilian element, although the strategy and framework for doing this was not initially 
articulated.  
 
Unlike previous models of ‘peace-building’, the PRT’s were designed to 
merge the traditionally parallel roles of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
the military. The concept was developed as an offshoot of the ‘Coalition 
Humanitarian Liaison Cells’. These were small groups of military personnel tasked to 
assess and address humanitarian needs within in Afghanistan in 2002. During the 
early stages, these cells effectively established relationships with NGOs and UN aid 
                                               
360 Government assistance to Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraq, 9 June, 2003, 
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/government+assistance+operation+enduring+freedom+and+iraq 
361 New Zealand's Current Involvement in Afghanistan,  New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
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missions, enabling a robust appreciation of the reconstruction requirements. Their 
successes led to an expansion into the form of the first PRT in Gardez in January 
2003. The idea was to get into areas where there was little or no Afghan 
governmental or development community presence and promote reconstruction. As 
of March 2010, there were 27 PRTs in Afghanistan each commanded by one of the 
ISAF member-states (USA command 12 of these PRTs).  
 
The Provincial Reconstruction Team in Bamyan was designed as a tool for 
delivering the pillars of civil society. The basic structure of a PRT contains both 
military and civilian components working in unison. Military units focus on force 
protection and civil affairs, while civilians, such as police and aid staff, advise and 
train Afghan officials. PRTs are commanded by the military and generally staffed by 
between 60 to 100 personnel, though some, such as the Canadian PRT in Kandahar, 
are staffed by up to 350.  
 
With the new government taking office in late 2008, various reviews of the 
mission were commissioned. One of these was the Review of New Zealand Official 
Development Assistance Supported activities in Afghanistan.362 Simon Williamson, 
an independent consultant, was tasked to “assess the strategic direction and focus of 
the programme” in order to inform the next 3-5 years.363 At the outset, the review was 
cognisant of the widely reported assumption that much of the international 
engagement in Afghanistan lacked strategy. This was demonstrated in New Zealand 
where for the period under review it was found that “no clear, written strategy or 
programme framework exists” for the various NZ contributions.364 It was noted that 
NZPRT was the most significant development actor in Bamyan, though NZDF 
acknowledged that they were not expert in development.365 However, there was an 
absence of input by development professionals to the design of projects and NZPRT 
did not have a monitoring and evaluation framework in place. Due to this, the report 
found that the “extent to which projects have addressed the needs of development in 
a sustainable, relevant and effective way is unknown and therefore likely to be 
limited.”366 
 
 One of the key recommendations to come out of the review was a need for a 
senior NZAID advisor to be permanently placed within NZPRT. To enable this to 
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Afghanistan (Independent Advisor, 2009)  6. 
363 Ibid. 
364 Ibid. 
365 Ibid. 
366 Ibid.   6. 
Chapter 5: New Zealand’s Whole-of-Government Approach to Peace Support Operations 
 
87 
 
work, the advisor would preferably have the same level of authority as the NZDF 
Senior National Officer. The advisor would also have a role in increasing coherence 
of all funds flowing through the PRT. This was a further admission that Defence 
professionals alone are not equipped to successfully carry out civil reconstruction – 
there needs to be a whole-of-government approach that draws in relevant expertise 
from across the whole of government.  
 
 The experience in Afghanistan has been very useful in identifying the gaps in 
New Zealand’s whole-of-government approach to the Provincial Reconstruction 
Team in Bayman. The Williamson Review found that a higher degree of strategic 
input was required from across government stakeholders at all levels of decision 
making and action. While the DESC system outlined earlier provides sound 
coordination at the senior level of governance, there was a particular lack of 
horizontal coordination at the programme management and service delivery levels in 
Wellington and Afghanistan.  
 
 
5.4.3 Solomon Islands 
 
In 2003, New Zealand also became deeply involved in the complex peace 
support mission in Solomon Islands. The Regional Assistance Mission in Solomon 
Islands (RAMSI) was novel in that it was police-led, reflecting a theme of the Brahimi 
Report in 2000.367 RAMSI was also focused upon building the pillars of society from 
the outset. As well as the contribution from NZ Police and NZDF, a number of New 
Zealand civilian personnel also serve with the Mission.368 The Mission was from the 
outset one of the first internationally that operated a whole-of-government approach 
to reconstruction. 
 
Until 2006, RAMSI was being held as a ‘model of best practice’ and received 
a high level of admiration.369 Regrettably, the mission suffered a serious obstacle 
when there was violence during the 2006 elections. Mary Louise O’Callaghan 
lamenting the lack of cultural awareness of the Australian and New Zealanders 
emphasised that:370 
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The scene of the April 2006 protests outside parliament where the predominantly 
Australian and New Zealand PPF officers could be seen acting in a seeming vacuum 
from both the mood of the crowd and the senior ranking local RSIP officers present at 
the scene was a chilling illustration of the dangers of trying to rebuild someone else’s 
country without being steeped in understanding of that culture and the dynamics of that 
community. 
 
O’Callaghan was critical of the inability of the donor nations to better integrate 
themselves into the operating environment. The break down in law and order in 2006 
was indicative of a failure by RAMSI to establish deep relationships with the 
Solomon’s community – to gain their trust and importantly to encourage their 
‘ownership’ of the mission. In order to do this, the staff at the front lines required 
better cultural, social and historical knowledge of the society they were meant to be 
assisting.   
 
Although RAMSI was distinct from the mission in Timor-Leste in many ways, 
a number of the same problems plagued the intervention. In 2006 Matthew Allen 
highlighted several pervasive issues that challenged the effectiveness of the 
Mission:371 
 
The [Participating Police Force] deliberate isolation from the community—the location 
of its base on the outskirts of Honiara, its refusal to consume locally produced 
foodstuffs, its reluctance to have its people walking the streets, the inability of the 
majority of its people to speak Pijin, the high rotation of rate of its officers through the 
provincial posts and through the operation as a whole—is inimical to this process of 
interaction and exchange. 
 
For the NZ police, the same six-month rotations as in Timor-Leste were the norm. 
There was only limited language training and the pre-deployment and in-country 
cultural instruction was limited. The issues Mathew Allen refers to are vitally 
important in gaining and maintaining legitimacy for an operation – especially within 
the hearts and minds of the local population.372 
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5.4.4 Many Departments ≠ Whole-of-Government 
 
 The inability to find rapid and enduring results in these operations has 
troubled officials. In 2008 Sinclair Dinnen looked to the justification for these 
operations and posited the question of whether the initial conceptualisation of "failed" 
and "fragile" states was adequate.373 As this was the foundation for the design and 
implementation of state (re)construction, he believed there was “Insufficient 
appreciation of the distinct forces that characterize post-colonial states”.374 Dinnen 
argued that a lack of detailed understanding of the social and political forces and the 
fragmented settings in these nations has “tended to render external state-building 
projects, at best, ineffective, and, at worst, disruptive and destabilizing.”375  
 
Dinnen’s observations have specific resonance when applied to an argument 
for the application of a whole-of-government approach to peace support operations. 
A key rationale behind the approach in domestic governance was to manage the 
wicked problems that transgressed multiple layers and sectors of society. Detailed 
ongoing research was required to understand the intricacies of these difficult social 
issues and long-term strategies and collective outcomes had to be designed and 
continually re-evaluated.  
 
The complex issues that motivated the whole-of-government approach in 
domestic governance are conceptually no different to the complex issues donor 
nations are facing when entering peace support operations. While structural 
adaptations are a central component of addressing these complex operations, to best 
support and shape these structural changes, deeper cultural awareness of the host 
nation’s culture is essential. Academics and practitioners such as David Kilcullen and 
Montgomery McFate, not without controversy,376 have been strong advocates for the 
extensive use of social scientists on the front lines in places such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan.377 The awareness is that there has been a stark lack of detailed social 
analysis of the operating environment. As noted by McFate, “One of the central 
epistemological tenets of anthropology is cultural relativism – understanding other 
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societies from within their own framework.”378 Reinforcing Sinclair Dinnen’s argument 
above, McFate concluded that:379 
 
While the consequences of a lack of cultural knowledge might be most apparent (or 
perhaps most deadly) in a counterinsurgency, a failure to understand foreign cultures 
has been a major contributing factor in multiple national-security and intelligence 
failures. 
 
There is strong argument for effective and efficient coordination of 
government agencies involved in complex peace support operations. A whole-of-
government approach is arguably the tool to achieve this. To do this efficiently and 
effectively a whole-of-government approach to peace support operations requires not 
only engagement of multiple agencies and better use of expertise across 
departments, but also a deeper understanding of why and how. Enhanced cultural 
awareness of the operating environment will enable better identification of where to 
place resources and to more efficiently join-up.  
 
There should be extensive education into the culture and history of the ‘failed’ 
state that is being assisted. In relation to Dinnen and McFate’s arguments, staff that 
are being deployed to these operations require deeper knowledge of the operating 
environment. Specifically, there need to be an enhanced focus upon a higher level of 
education before and during deployment. This will require developing closer 
relationships with universities in New Zealand. Key academics should be identified 
and commissioned to undertake research that informs New Zealand’s operations. It 
would be advantageous if those academics could spend extended time seconded to 
these operations in-country so they can train and provide advice to staff while on 
operation. Master Classes with universally accepted qualifications should be 
regularly available with officials gaining personal value through promotional 
opportunities or increased salary. 
 
Cultural awareness of the operating environment needs to be supplemented 
by enhanced institutional cultural awareness. Institutional culture informs how 
organisations identify their interests and priorities; how they define problems and 
ways to solve them; and the value and meanings they attach the surrounding 
environment.380 Focusing on culture draws attention to the fact that effective whole-
of-government approach may require more than the elimination of technical barriers 
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or harmonisation of standard operating procedures.381 Andrea Baumann argued in 
2008 that, “despite widespread consensus over the need for a holistic approach in 
theory, the implementation of comprehensive or whole-of-government strategies has 
given rise to debate, controversy and concern in practice.”382 She argued that:383 
 
… the mechanisms and structures aimed at improving co-operation between military 
and civilian organisations tasked with the implementation of a comprehensive 
response are unlikely to succeed if they merely brush over the fundamental cultural 
differences that exist between these organisations.  
 
Baumann referred to a recent lecture by General John Craddock where he compared 
the interplay of civilian and military efforts to a soccer game “where each player has 
an assigned role, but ‘due to the fluidity of the game, these roles are not distinct, 
rather the borders between those roles are often blurred.”384 In providing additional 
insight to the analogy with regard to organisational culture, Baumann continued 
“without a better understanding of each individual player’s rationale and motivation 
for playing his part in a specific way, it will be difficult to work with overlapping 
roles.”385 
 
In order to leverage the most value out of these relationships, there needs 
there needs to be an assessment of where and how each department can 
complement the workings of the other agencies so they work together to reach 
collective outcomes. On a practical level, this may require a portion of ‘pre-
deployment training’ to include officials from the various departments that will be 
working together in-theatre. Again, institutional culture needs to be a component of 
this training as this allows for a critical appreciation of best practices and perceived 
lessons learned. For example, Baumann argues that it has become a default policy 
recommendation that joint training will “lessen cultural divides by reducing 
misperception and building bridges between military and civilian personnel.”386 
However, what is also needed, according to Baumann, “is an understanding of why 
these cultural barriers exist in the first place and whether it always makes sense to 
tear them down.”387 
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Another possibility is continual cross-departmental briefings – at all levels of 
decision-making and action – including the so-called front lines. A further tool, which 
some departments have used regularly, is secondments. MFAT and Defence for a 
long time have been seconding and moving staff between their departments.388 This 
provides for socialisation and education into the respective networks, cultures and 
practices of those agencies. This should be expanded into the more non-traditional 
security agencies that are becoming involved in peace support operations. It would 
also promote fluid movement of staff between agencies and provide opportunities for 
specialised staff to spend longer periods in recipient countries. 
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
New Zealand’s contributions to these complex peace support operations have 
been ongoing and multifaceted. There has been a continual evolution and 
sharpening of the whole-of-government approach. The literature and the collective 
experiences of the operations indicate that a true whole-of-government approach is 
more than just multiple agencies working ‘together’. It requires a deep knowledge of 
why the agencies are working together and how they best ‘fit together’ in order to 
leverage the most value from the collaboration. In addition, there must be extensive 
education into the complex nature of the environment these agencies are working in 
– the history, social and cultural nature of the recipient country. This requires drawing 
on more expertise inside and outside of government to achieve this difficult level of 
capability.  
 
In order to achieve these difficult tasks, any mission needs to be guided by a 
clear national statement of intent. In addition, individual whole-of-government country 
strategies need to be written that clearly state mutually agreed outcomes as well as 
an accountability framework.389 Moreover, this must project forward at least ten 
years. Sustained, deeper, long-term commitments need to be made from the outset. 
This would emphasise its strategic approach to its partners and help to ensure a 
cohesive approach in the field. It would also allow effective monitoring of the impact 
of the overall whole-of-government approach in a country. If this is established from 
the conceptualisation of these deployments, it allows long-term planning and 
specialist skills specific to the recipient nation to be incorporated into the training of 
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personnel. These enhanced skills would then benefit from longer deployment 
rotations. While there are significant front end costs in deepening the level of 
involvement in such ways, the long term benefits are found in the enduring viability of 
these states.390 
 
The literature demonstrates the New Zealand Defence Force was an early 
supporter of a whole-of-government approach to security issues. They raised the 
notion at the turn of the century and continued to champion its use in public 
documents throughout the decade. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
had used whole-of-government rhetoric in their public documents, it was not until 
2006 when the notion took hold. MFAT subsequently took ownership of the approach 
abroad and sought, quite naturally, to use it as a tool to achieve the Ministries core 
objectives.  
 
If government departments involved in New Zealand’s complex peace support 
operations are utilise a whole-of-government approach there needs to be a common 
understanding of what that approach is. Furthermore, there needs to be an 
understanding of why they are doing it, the value to their organisation, and how it 
operates. To this end, if a Government priority is to operate a whole-of-government 
approach in these operations there is a requirement for a clear statement to that 
effect. This research argues that a National Security Policy is required that articulates 
the requirement for all departments, when called upon, to work collectively towards 
the government outcome of a safe and thriving New Zealand. 
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Chapter 6: Findings and Conclusions 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
An underlying question that can be extracted from this research is how does 
the notion of a whole-of-government approach add value to the service delivery of 
New Zealand’s offshore engagements? This chapter seeks to begin to answer that 
question. In doing so it will propose a framework that the author argues will add value 
to New Zealand’s peace support operations.  
 
 
6.2 Overview 
 
 As stated in the introduction, one of the barriers in performing this research is 
the difficulty in locating comprehensive information about New Zealand’s 
commitments to peace support operations. A significant reason for this is that there is 
no centralised source providing comprehensive information about New Zealand’s 
whole-of-government contributions.391 As was found in the Australian Senate Report 
regarding Australia’s operations, New Zealand’s peace support operations have now 
widened well beyond the scope of the military. It is important that New Zealand’s 
whole-of-government operations be accompanied by whole-of-government 
reporting.392 This will enable Parliament and the New Zealand public to identify the 
size and nature of the resources provided by government to peace operations. An 
appropriate agency, such as DPMC, should be mandated to perform public whole-of-
government reporting on New Zealand’s contribution to peace support operations. 
This would require the department’s annual report to include a description of all 
peace support operations, a list of the contributing government agencies, and, for 
each relevant agency:393 
 
• a description of its role in the operation; 
• the financial contribution to the operation during that reporting year; 
• the peak number of personnel deployed by the agency during the reporting year and 
the date at which the peak occurred; and 
• the number of personnel deployed as at the end of the reporting year. 
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In conjunction with accurate and clear public reporting, there is a requirement 
for publicly accessible indicators of success. The Introduction to this thesis outlined 
that one of the main the barriers to effective whole-of-government working in 
domestic public management was poor understanding of performance indicators.394 
This research has found no public indication that New Zealand agencies involved in 
peace support operations have developed effective indictors for joined up working.  
 
This research contends that performance indicators are needed by 
government to effectively assess the success or otherwise of contributions to peace 
support operations. In addition, they will ensure that lessons learnt from an operation 
are captured for future operations. In order to construct an indicator framework, there 
will need to be clearly articulated whole-of-government outcomes for these 
operations. As such, whole-of-government country strategies should be employed to 
guide this process, which in turn would be guided by a whole-of-government national 
security strategy. In relation to peace support operations, the OECD in 2006 called 
for a “joint policy statement by the key ministers, providing the rationale for whole-of-
government engagement in fragile states as well as the main objective”.395 The 
added value for this, they highlighted, was that “governments could use such a policy 
statement as a means of accountability for higher-level officials to put joined-up 
working into operation in their respective organisations.”396 
 
 
 
6.3 What Should Whole-of-Government Look Like? 
 
The literature indicates that a whole-of-government approach is an efficient 
and effective tool for maximising value of public sector governance. Successive 
governments have embraced this and instructed that it be implemented in New 
Zealand’s peace support operations.397 Nevertheless, other than an increase in 
contributions from multiple-agencies, it is not altogether clear that the whole-of-
government approach has been effectively implemented across all levels of decision 
making and action – from the Government strategy to the service delivery level. Put 
another way, what would an effective and efficient whole of government approach 
look like? Various question flow from this, such as: 
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• Are these operations, as a whole, well run? Where are their particular strengths 
or weakness; 
• Is the quality of management across government departments as a whole 
improving, declining or stable; 
• Does the government have the required management capacity to deliver on its 
outcomes agenda; and, 
• How does a whole-of-government approach affect these three questions? 
 
What would be instructive is an assessment framework that is able to evaluate and 
inform the whole-of-government approach in such operations. This would provide a 
clear picture of what a whole-of-government approach to peace support operations 
would look like. It would also serve to improve the performance of New Zealand’s 
whole-of-government contribution to these operations.  
 
With the development of the new “managing for outcomes” environment, 
whole-of-government brings added complexities to accountability and incentive 
mechanisms.398 The traditional association of decision making, accountability and 
performance management with vertical structures can restrain shared outcomes and 
responsibilities between organisations.399 To ensure success, performance 
management and incentives need to be specifically tailored to support a whole-of-
government approach. Currently, rewards for achieving organisational aims can be 
stronger than the incentives for horizontal achievements. With a strong focus on 
existing performance management, departments can often be tempted to ignore 
issues that require shared responsibility.400 Whole-of-government therefore requires 
shared performance indicators that must be aligned with incentives and reporting 
systems. 
 
  That said there are significant challenges in devising credible and useful 
performance indicators when assessing whole-of-government performance in peace 
support operations. Specific challenges that relate to whole-of-government 
collaboration in any sector include: 
 
• Formalities (conflicting mandates, no Memorandum of Understandings 
(MoUs)); 
• Culture, mindset, prejudices; 
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• Bureaucratic rigidity (despite wiliness, no flexibility to adjust plans and 
budget); 
• Funding (a zero-sum game, competing for funds); 
• Priorities (may share the vision, but not how to reach goals); 
• Resources (more funding goes to some departments, less for others); 
• Leadership (who takes the lead). 
 
These are also relevant to peace support operations. The Australian Senate Report 
found that:401 
 
The task of measuring the effectiveness of the whole-of-government contribution 
means examining issues such as interoperability and [civil-military cooperation]. Such 
matters raise questions about who should assess this overall performance and how an 
agency’s assessment of its performance feeds into a whole-of-government appraisal.  
 
The same issues arise in New Zealand. The advantage for New Zealand however is 
the relatively minor size of New Zealand’s contributions to peace support operations 
and the coherent shape and location of the bureaucracy. New Zealand’s size is also 
a drawback however, as there is a relatively small public sector that is being given 
more to do and within the current global financial crisis, less to do it with. Regardless, 
prudent investment with clearly established long-term outcomes will inevitably 
provide added-value for less cost over the long-term.  There would be considerable 
advantage in a central agency, possibly DPMC, taking the lead with assessment. 
DPMC has recently reinforced its oversight and direction-setting role in the 
intelligence sector. Assessment of the whole-of-government approach to peace 
support operations would be a natural extension of its mandate.  
 
 
6.3.1 Performance Indicators 
 
The first chapter highlighted that the key barriers for whole-of-government 
working are departmental silos, a lack of relevant data, lack of flexibility in funding 
arrangements, and poor understanding of performance indicators.402 While the 
former issues have been assessed throughout this research, performance indicators 
have not been specifically addressed. 
 
                                               
401 Government Australia's Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations   24.29. 
402 See also: Hyde, 'How to Make the Rhetoric of Joined-up Government Really Work.' 
Callum Martin 
98 
 
Indicators are summary data that represent an issue of concern or measure 
change or progress toward achieving a desired outcome or objective.403 They may 
indicate areas that need further investigation or attention. Indicators consist of 
quantitative and qualitative data presented in a formalised way to describe past and 
current conditions in a system.404 Typically, a number of indicators are required to 
evaluate whether a desired outcome has been achieved.405 Indicators measure 
changes over time – they show trends and when monitored over a period and can 
illustrate whether things are improving, remaining static, fluctuating or declining with 
respect to the outcome they are being used to measure.406 Indicators should be 
easily interpretable measures that describe what is occurring with regard to a 
particular issue. They can be roughly divided into two groups – those that articulate 
the state of affairs with regard to the issue, and those that depict trends with specific 
spatial scales and time horizons.407 Indicators can also help track and assess 
performance at the organisational level. 
 
 When seeking to develop a set of performance indicators, Mark Schacter 
believes there are two fundamental questions in order to produce a credible and 
practical assessment framework for whole-of-government management:408 
 
• Is it possible to reach a reasonable degree of consensus on the key ingredients of 
good public management at the whole-of-government level? 
 
• Is it possible to produce a set of measures of manageable scope that, while not 
perfect, will be seen as good enough to support reliable and actionable assertions 
about the quality of public management across an entire government? 
 
Again, the New Zealand public sector landscape is well socialised and relatively 
small. The DESC system enables the key players in the senior ranks to work closely 
                                               
403 Indicators for Monitoring Community Outcomes: Methodology and Process for Developing Indicators  
(Canterbury Region Community Plans Group, 2005)  available at 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/government_finance/local_government/~/media/Statistics/Pub
lications/Stats-by-Area/regional-statistics/canterbury-region-outcome-indicators-18-07-05.ashx 
(accessed 13 January 2011) 4. 
404 Professor Ali Memon Choosing Community-Based Indicators to Monitor and Report Progress 
Towards Community Outcomes (PUCM LGA Report 4, Environmental Management Group 
Environment, Society and Design Division, Lincoln University, Canterbury, 2008)  available at 
http://www.waikato.ac.nz/igci/pucm/lga/lgarpt4.pdf (accessed 13 January 2011) 8. 
405 Indicators for Monitoring Community Outcomes: Methodology and Process for Developing Indicators    
4. 
406 Ibid. 
407 Profiles of Tools and Tactics for Environmental Mainstreaming: Indicators  (International Institute for 
Environment and Development (IIED), 2009)  available at http://www.environmental-
mainstreaming.org/documents/EM%20Profile%20No%2010%20-
%20Indicators%20%2820%20November%2009%29.pdf (accessed 20 February 2011). 
408 Mark Schacter How Good Is Your Government? Assessing the Quality of Public Management (Mark 
Schacter Consulting, 2008)  available at http://www.schacterconsulting.com/documents/howgood.pdf 
(accessed 14 January 2011) 4. 
Chapter 6: Findings and Conclusions 
 
99 
 
within the required agencies. In addition, there is an existing central agency, DPMC, 
which can provide oversight and guidance. Reaching consensus on the key 
ingredients of ‘good public management’ should be readily achievable. There should 
also be little difficulty in developing a set of measures of manageable scope to 
assess the quality of management of peace support operations. In order to provide 
this, a robust set of indicators would aspire to: 
 
• Strengthen accountability when implementing commitments in peace support 
operations; 
• Detect progress and achievements in the implementation of whole-of-
government approach in these operations; 
• Detect gaps and weaknesses in the implementation of this approach; 
• Facilitate subsequent policy making and prioritisation of actions, as well as 
possible benchmarking; 
• Ensure consistency across departments; 
• Motivate personnel; 
• Facilitate clear communication about the implementation of the approach; 
• Improve NZ Inc visibility. 
 
The indicators would be required to inform decision-making and progress on several 
key themes that have been raised in this research. They specifically relate to 
developing: 
 
• awareness and understanding of partner agencies’ institutional cultures, 
capacity and capability; 
• greater understanding of host nation social and institutional cultures and 
histories; 
• a culture of collective responsibility towards achieving whole-of-government 
outcomes; and, 
• whole-of-government country strategies that project and plan for long-term 
outcomes. 
 
Indicators by themselves are only a component of a robust system of measurement. 
Schacter highlights that a performance measurement framework is abstract by its 
very nature.409 Practicable and constructive measurement requires simplification, 
particularly when dealing with a subject as large and multifaceted as the quality of 
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public management in complex peace support operations. Schacter argues that 
“While the assessment framework must not ignore critical data, it must also not 
overwhelm users with fine detail, nor should it impose a heavy administrative 
burden.”410 
 
 
6.3.2 A Value-added Framework 
 
This thesis posits a framework which is divided into four categories, representing 
the four broad areas this research indicates should be the focus of a whole-of-
government approach to peace support operations: 
 
1. Institutional Cultures  
2. Social Cultures 
3. Collective Responsibility 
4. Social, Political and Economic Outcomes 
 
This is not an exhaustive framework; that would require extensive consultation 
amongst all stakeholders over an extended timeframe. This is an initial framework 
based on the findings of this research conducted within the limited scope of a 
Master’s thesis.  
 
 
1) Awareness of Institutional Cultures 
 
 
 
Performance Indicator 1: An enhanced understanding of institutional cultures, 
capacity and capabilities of New Zealand agencies. 
• Develop programs for personnel to be educated in the capabilities, capacities and 
raison d’être of partner agencies.   
• Develop programs and policies that promote the education into and adaptation of 
institutional cultures, mindsets, and prejudices (especially between military and 
civilian agencies). 
• Create increased opportunities for more fluid sector-wide movement of personnel. 
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• Timings of deployment rotations are designed to increase the effectiveness of 
relationships in roles where close personal contact with partner agencies is 
required. 
 
2) Awareness of Social Cultures 
 
 
 
Performance Indicator 2:  A greater awareness and education into host nation 
cultures and history. 
• Provide opportunities increased education and specialisation into the culture and 
history of the host nation. 
• Early identification and commitment to specialist skills relevant to the host nation. 
• Provide opportunity and incentive for language skills and relationships to be 
strengthened. 
• Develop closer relationships with universities in order to leverage off relevant 
expertise and develop a culture of learning. 
• Provide opportunities for academics to be seconded to operations so can assist 
with training and research in the host country. 
• Lengths of deployment rotations are designed to increase the effectiveness of 
relationships in roles where close personal contact with host nationals is required. 
 
 
3) Collective Responsibility 
 
 
 
Performance Indicator 3: An increased obligation and willingness to promote New 
Zealand’s priorities and outcomes above individual agency’s priorities and outcomes.  
 
• The development of policies and the design and implementation of programs 
systematically incorporate the perspectives of all stakeholders. 
• A transparent and interactive process of engagement with reinforced leadership 
and strengthened steering capacity. 
• Increased flexibility in funding arrangements. 
A culture of collective responsibility towards achieving whole-of-government 
outcomes. 
All deployed staff are educated in host nation culture and history. 
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• Individual performance appraisals are linked to collective contributions and 
results. 
• Results-based performance information is routinely used as a foundation for 
continuous improvement of whole-of-government program/policy performance. 
 
4) Social, Political and Economic Outcomes 
 
 
 
Performance Indicator 4: The quality of results management meets the needs and 
expectations of the host nation. 
 
• The host nation is central stakeholder and is continually consulted with regard to 
policy development and outcomes. 
• The best interests of the host nation are at the forefront when developing 
measurable social and economic outcomes for peace support operations.  
• The New Zealand government regularly reports on its performance against 
intended outcomes – using data that are complete, accurate and valid – in a 
manner that gives the host nation a basis for evaluating New Zealand’s 
performance in relation to results. 
 
Performance Indicator 5: The quality of results management achieves the 
expectations of the New Zealand government. 
 
• A core set of measurable whole-of-government social and economic outcomes is 
defined and communicated. The contribution of public programs towards them is 
evaluated through performance measurement and assessment at the 
government-wide level. 
• Measurable department-wide social and economic outcomes that are integrated 
with government-wide outcomes are defined and communicated. The contribution 
of public programs towards them is assessed through performance measurement 
and evaluation at the departmental level. 
• Whole-of-government country strategies that project and plan for long-term 
outcomes. 
New Zealand’s peace support operations meet the needs and expectations of the 
host nation and achieve results desired by the New Zealand government. 
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• Performance is regularly measured against intended outcomes – using data that 
are complete, accurate and valid – in a manner that gives Parliament a basis for 
holding the government accountable for performance in relation to results. 
 
Performance Indicator 6: The quality of information provided to New Zealanders. 
 
• Performance is publicly reported in a manner that gives New Zealanders a basis 
for holding the government accountable for performance in relation to results. 
• Information on peace support operations is centrally located and publicly 
available. 
• Government increases its ability to create and disseminate information so it is 
readily digestible by the general public.  
 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
This thesis has found that three main factors are required for successful 
implementation of a whole-of-government approach in peace support operations. 
Direction from Government is essential. A national security statement is a pre-
requisite to provide unambiguous strategic direction.  
 
This must be followed by culture change across the growing number of 
agencies involved in these operations. The research found that this should be 
concentrated in two distinct but interrelated areas. The first is to develop a culture of 
shared understanding between public departments and agencies. This will provide 
better awareness of each agencies rationale for action and ways of doing business. 
In return there would be enhanced ability to leverage the most value out of these 
partnerships. The second is to drive a culture of shared understanding between the 
combined ‘NZ Inc’ contributions and the host nation. This would provide New 
Zealand officials with deeper awareness of the history and culture of the host state. 
The desired result is an enhanced ability to shape the assistance to the specific 
environment, individuals or programs.  
 
 The final requirement is for the development of performance indicators and 
measurement frameworks. Such tools would enable identification and achievement 
of government outcomes. Attached to this is the need to provide enhanced official 
reporting on the progress towards government outcomes. 
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The findings of this thesis provide opportunity for further research. One of 
these is extensive case studies of the whole-of-government approach in New 
Zealand’s peace support operations. This would require a high degree of 
declassification of official information. Therefore it would best lend itself to doctoral 
research. A further opportunity is to conduct thorough research into how to best drive 
culture change across the wider security sector. In addition, there is value in 
providing analysis into how the ‘soft issues’, such as institutional cultures and values, 
can be adapted to promote superior service delivery in complex operating 
environments. This requires research into how to drive a culture of learning and 
awareness of host state history and society.  
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